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Abstract
Evolutionary dynamics is an essential component of a mathematical and computational ap-
proach to biology. In recent years the mathematical description of evolution has moved to a
description of any kind of process where information is being reproduced in a natural envi-
ronment. In this manner everything that lives is a product of evolutionary dynamics. Often
the behaviour of systems of interacting individuals can be described within game-theoretic
models. Evolutionary game theory is such a framework, as a branch of game theory, to
study the interaction of non-rational beings like animals or humans under the influence of
the changing environment.
Virtually all human societies are based on cooperation of many individuals, which is an
important precondition for the development of their complexity. In small groups reciprocal
altruism can arise from repeated interactions, whereas in larger human communities cooper-
ation can evolve through indirect reciprocity. In this case, individuals cooperate on the basis
of a reputation obtained in previous interactions. Such reputation systems have particular
interesting applications in the growing field of anonymous trade via online platforms. While
different reputation mechanisms and the effect of unintentional errors have recently attracted
a lot of interest, the effect of fake reputations - or fraud - has not been taken sufficiently
into account, although such fraud might have a detrimental impact on cooperation based on
indirect reciprocity.
In this thesis a simple model is analyzed in which such an effect is taken into account for
the first time. After careful consideration of more complicated models this minimal model
has been developed. It has several advantages: First, it is simple enough to allow the ana-
lytical calculation of the parameter regions that determine the dynamics of the system. And
secondary, it allows a direct comparison with behavioral experiments and could be the ba-
sis of a further experimental and mathematical analysis of fraud in reputation systems. The
results show that cooperation based on indirect reciprocity is robust with respect to fake rep-
utations and can even be enhanced by them. It has been found that fraud does not necessarily
have a detrimental effect on social systems. Furthermore, an extension of the usual replicator
dynamics is introduced and a mechanism that works in cyclic games as well as in non-cylic
games is developed by introducing a dynamical learning rate. The framework is formulated
in finite populations as well as in infinite populations and the relationship between these dif-
ferent approaches is shown. It was shown that a population with such a dynamic learning
rate can gain an increased average payoff in transient phases and thereby can also exploit
external noise. This mechanism seems to be of particular interest in economic systems.
Kurzfassung
Evolutiona¨re Dynamik ist eine wesentliche Komponente einer mathematischen und rech-
nerischen Anna¨herung an die Biologie. In den letzten Jahren hat sich die mathematische
Beschreibung der Evolution stark vera¨ndert und liefert nunmehr eine Beschreibung fu¨r jeden
Prozess, bei dem Information in einer natu¨rlichen Umgebung reproduziert wird. In diesem
Sinne ist alles, was lebt, ein Produkt der Evolutiona¨ren Dynamik. Ha¨ufig kann man das
Verhalten interagierender Individuen mit spieltheoretischen Methoden beschreiben. Evo-
lutiona¨re Spieltheorie, als Zweig der Spieltheorie, bietet den Rahmen, um Interaktionen
von nicht rationalen Lebewesen, z.B. von Tieren oder Menschen, unter dem Einfluss einer
vera¨nderlichen Umgebung zu untersuchen. Nahezu alle menschlichen Gesellschaften basie-
ren auf Kooperation von vielen Individuen, welche eine wichtige Voraussetzung fu¨r die Ent-
wicklung ihrer Komplexita¨t ist. In kleineren Gruppen kann sich gegenseitiger Altruismus
aufgrund sich wiederholender Interaktionen entwickeln, wa¨hrend in gro¨ßeren menschlichen
Gemeinschaften Kooperation auch durch indirekte Wechselwirkung entstehen kann. In die-
sem Fall kooperieren die Individuen auf der Basis ihrer Reputation, die sie in vorausgegange-
nen Interaktionen erworben haben. Solche Reputationssysteme finden eine besonders inter-
essante Anwendung im wachsenden Feld anonymer Online-Plattformen. Wa¨hrend verschie-
dene Reputationsmechanismen und der Effekt von unbeabsichtigten Fehlern in letzter Zeit
großes Interesse erfuhren, wurde der Einfluß gefa¨lschter Reputation - oder Betrug - kaum
betrachtet, obwohl solch ein Betru¨gen mo¨glicherweise einen scha¨dlichen Einfluss auf auf
Kooperation basierende indirekte Reziprozita¨t haben ko¨nnte. In dieser Arbeit wird ein einfa-
ches Modell analysiert, indem solch ein Effekt zum ersten Mal betrachtet wird. Ausgehend
von komplizierteren Modellen wird ein Minimalmodell entwickelt, welches folgende Vortei-
le hat: Erstens ist es einfach genug fu¨r eine analytische Berechnung der Parameterbereiche,
die die Dynamik des Systems bestimmen und zweitens erlaubt es direkte Vergleiche mit Ver-
haltensexperimenten und ko¨nnte so die Basis fu¨r weitere experimentelle und mathematische
Analysen von Betru¨gen in Reputationssystemen bilden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Koope-
ration, basierend auf indirekter Reziprozita¨t, robust ist bezu¨glich gefa¨lschter Reputation und
sogar unter ihrem Einfuss versta¨rkt werden kann. D.h, Betru¨ger haben nicht notwendigerwei-
se einen scha¨dlichen Einfluss auf Sozialsysteme. Desweiteren wurde eine Erweiterung der
gewo¨hnlichen Replikatorgleichungen eingefu¨hrt und ein Mechanismus sowohl fu¨r zyklische
als auch fu¨r nicht-zyklische Spiele entwickelt, indem eine dynamische Lernrate eingefu¨hrt
wurde. Dieser Rahmen wurde in endlichen und unendlichen Populationen formuliert und
es konnten die Beziehungen zwischen den unterschiedlichen Ansa¨tzen gezeigt werden. Po-
pulationen mit einer dynamischen Lernrate erreichen einen erho¨hten mittleren Gewinn auf
Transienten und ko¨nnen dabei auch externes Rauschen ausnutzen. Diese Ergebnisse ko¨nnten
auch fu¨r das Versta¨ndnis wirtschaftlicher Systeme von Interesse sein.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Responding to a growing interest over the past years the theory of “Complexity” is an emerg-
ing interdisciplinary field of study that spans fields as diverse as physics, mathematics, biol-
ogy, economics, organizational science and computational intelligence. Basically, a system
is complex if we cannot understand it through simple cause-and-effect relationships or other
standard methods of system analysis. Furthermore, in a complex system we cannot reduce
the interplay of individual elements to the study of those individual elements considered in
isolation. This means that often several different models of the complete system, each at
a different level of abstraction, are necessary. Nevertheless, modern science often does not
reflect all of reality, but only the part of reality that is ordered, linear, ergodic, isolatable, pre-
dictable, observable, and controllable. The trend toward disciplinary specialization1 stands
in opposite to the major need for knowledge integration and transdisciplinarity to understand
complex systems. Recently, life sciences, in particular biology, are on the brink of an un-
matchable theoretic expansion. For example, mutation and selection have been described by
exact mathematical equations using methods from statistical physics. The theory of evolu-
tion became more and more a mathematical theory2. Other typical examples of “complex
systems” are the immune system, nervous system, social and economic networks, prebiotic
evolution or insect colonies.
This thesis deals with evolutionary dynamics and evolutionary games which are also con-
sidered as typical examples for complex adaptive systems (Bak, 1996; Jensen, 1998; Schus-
ter, 2002; Nowak, 2006; Schuster, 2007).
1.1.1 Statistical Physics and Biological Systems
During the last twenty years, theoretical physicists got more and more into contact with
biology (computational neuroscience). Artificial neural networks which cover fields as cog-
nitive sciences, natural and artificial intelligence, brain, mind and behaviour, perception and
1For example our knowledge in medical science is doubled all six years and this is the typical time scale a
medical student needs to finish its education in a german university
2Charles Darwin regretted in his autobiography not to have a deeper knowledge of mathematical methods.
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action, learning and memory, robotics, man-machine communication, etc. are well estab-
lished in statistical physics (Amit, 1989; Hertz, Krogh and Palmer, 1991; Churchland, 1992;
Arbib, 1998). In the beginning of the 1980s the famous physicist John Hopfield (Hop-
field, 1982) introduced a recurrent artificial neural network which works as an associative
memory, and thus is capable to store patterns. If in these networks a perturbed version of
a stored pattern is presented, the network becomes attracted to the correct stored pattern
if it falls into its basin of attraction. Hopfield showed that there exists an energy function
which ensures that, if units are randomly chosen to update their activations, the network
will converge to states, which are local minima in the energy function. Thus, if a state is
a local minimum in the energy function, it is a stable state for the network. Furthermore,
Hopfield showed that this energy function belongs to a general class of models in physics,
called Ising models. It can be shown with methods of theoretical physics that this so called
“Hopfield model” has a storage capacity of L patterns depending on the network size N . If
L/N < 0.138 the recall of patterns is possible.
1.1.1.1 Statistical Physics and Evolutionary Dynamics
Beyond artificial neural networks we will demontrate in this paragraph corresponding basic
principles between evolutionary dynamics and statistical physics (Hauert and Szabo, 2005;
Sella and Hirsch, 2005). Evolutionary dynamics is at the interface of dynamical systems and
evolutionary game theory. If we characterize the requirements of an evolutionary model we
can say that an evolutionary model combines two processes called selection and mutation.
The selection process favors certain individual varieties between a given population. The mu-
tation process creates these varieties. Usually, in evolutionary game theory these processes
are iterated in time, thus, we could say that evolution is a process composed of selection and
mutation iterated in time (Jacob, 1997). This requires, of course, that we have a sufficiently
clear picture of the relevant selection and mutation processes. If we model this processes
from a physical point of view and apply methods from physical to biological systems then
we have two quite different possibilities. In a bottom-up point of view the biological systems
(think of populations or ecosystems) are described, despite of their complexity, with physical
laws on a low level representation. On the one side we might lose important details of the
system, but on the other side we can describe the main behaviour of the systems by using
simple physical laws. In a second step trails are made to get from this low level description
to more complex descriptions of the whole biological system. A different approach is to
consider similarities between a well understood physical system and a reduced biological
system, provided that the biological system is sufficiently complete. The advantage of this
approach is that we can use tools used in physical science for the description of biological
systems. For example Hertz, et al. (1991) used the Hopfield model (Hopfield, 1982) de-
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scribed in the previous paragraph to demonstrate the analogy between neural networks and
spin glasses (Hertz, Krogh and Palmer, 1991).
We now will describe the mathematical analogy between evolutionary and thermodynamic
systems to understand the interest of physicists in evolutionary dynamics. This illustrates
how established tools of statistical physics can be applied to evolutionary dynamics. One
analogy between evolutionary and thermodynamic systems is their description with state
variables (Table 1.1). In statistical physics state variables are for example certain particles
in a gas with given position, velocity or momenta. In evolutionary systems the gene with its
four-letter code A, T, C and G, denoting the nucleotides adenine, thymine, cytosine, and gua-
nine and organised in a double-stranded DNA to carry the genomic information, can be used
as a corresponding state variable. Another possibility is to use the frequency of a population
as a state variable. Another analogy exists concerning the fitness f of a given population
Evolutionary dynamics Statistical physics
State variable ~x = (A,C,C, ..., T ) ~s = (~qk, ~pk)
Additive fitness and energy W = ln(f(~x)) E = Hˆ(~s)
Population size and temperature ν = N − 1 β = 1
kBT
Boltzman factor Ei ∝ e−ν(−xi) Ei ∝ e−βEi
Invariance Wi →Wi + C Ei → Ei + C
Table 1.1: Analogy between evolutionary dynamics and statistical physics. There exists a
mathematical analogy between certain evolutionary and thermodynamic systems,
allowing the application of established methods of statistical physics to analyze
evolutionary models. All parameters are explained in the text in detail (Sella and
Hirsch, 2005).
and the energy E. The fitness f is a central concept in evolutionary theory. It describes the
capability of an individual of a certain population to reproduce. An individual with higher
fitness becomes more common. This process is called natural selection. It is convenient to
define the additive fitness as the logarithm of f with W = ln(f(~x)) because this allows us to
identify an analogy to a physical system at thermal equilibrium. The Boltzmann distribution
Ei ∝ e
−βEi with β = 1
kBT
gives the probability that a system is found in a microscopic state i
with a given energy Ei. Here, kB is the Boltzmann constant and T is temperature. In analogy
the probability that a given population is fixed (in the state variable i) is Ei ∝ e−ν(−xi). Thus,
we can say that ν is equivalent to β and the additive fitness −xi to the energy Ei. In appli-
cations of evolutionary dynamics the “temperature” of an evolutionary system is of course
not related to the physical temperature, but is simply a parameter controlling the dynamics.
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The parameter β is inversely proportional to the temperature. If the temperature is zero and
a physical system is in thermal equilibrium, it is found allways in the lowest energy state. In
this manner a given infinite population, as long as the evolutionary system is at steady state,
is always in the state of highest fitness. Otherwise, if the temperature is greater zero, the
probability to find the system in a certain microscopic state is depending alone on the state’s
energy. Similarly, in evolutionary systems, the probability to find a finite population in a
certain state depends only on the fitness of the population type. Even though in evolutionary
models the interactions between individuals such as animals in ecological and evolutionary
models, genes in population genetics, and people in social processes, is closely related to
statistical physics, which deals with systems of interacting particles, we have to distinguish
between these two systems. Whereas physical systems show a tendency to reach by-and-by
states characterized by the minimum of some global quantity, such as the total energy of
the system, population dynamics does not exhibit necessarily such general principle. For
example, agents in social models tend to maximize their own payoff, and genes or animals
maximize their individual fitness. If we now compare the energy E in physical systems with
the fitness W , which are both additive quantities, it has to be taken into account that in phys-
ical systems the energy is defined in such a way that it is reduced already by the physical
process itself. In contrast, in evolutionary systems the fitness increases during the dynamical
process. Consequently, the minus sign is introduced to complete the translation. In physical
systems the addition of a constant C to the energy of the microscopic states remains the dy-
namics unchanged. This invariance can occur also in evolutionary systems. Here the system
is invariant by adding a constant to the additive fitness. If we use the fitness f instead of the
additive fitness W the constant must be multiplying (fi → Cfi).
Taken together, the mathematical description of evolution of a population in a constant
environment has interesting analogous to that of a thermodynamic system. Thus, the methods
used to describe systems in statistical physics seem to be appropriate to describe evolutionary
systems.
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1.1.2 Outline
Let us now briefly summarize the train of thoughts pursued in this thesis.
In the remaining paragraphs of chapter one, the game theoretical background is given,
followed by surveys of evolutionary dynamics and statistical physics providing the method-
ological framework for subsequent studies on dynamics and evolution of games in finite and
infinite populations. Chapter two is the main chapter and contains three published articles.
Finally, the questions that where raised in this thesis are discussed and an outlook is given.
• In paragraph 1.2 a basic overview of the classical game theory is given to facili-
tate the dynamic evolutionary theory. The famous prisoner’s dilemma game and the
matching pennies game are discussed in detail, because this games are important sub-
jects of the publications. In particular, the fundamental notion of the Nash equilibrium
is introduced.
• In paragraph 1.3 a basic concept of evolutionary dynamics in finite and infinite popu-
lations is introduced. The games described in the previous paragraph are then analysed
in the context of evolutionary game theory. To address the problem of the equilib-
rium selection in games with multiple equilibria, basic properties of the deterministic
replicator dynamics and of the stochastic dynamics of finite populations are reviewed.
Additonally, the important concepts of evolutionary stability is explained.
• In paragraph 1.4 a survey of the publications presented in chapter two is given.
• In chapter 2 the publications are presented.
• In chapter 3 a conclusion and an outlook are given.
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1.2 Game Theory
1.2.1 Classical Game Theory
Game theory is a branch of mathematical analysis developed to study decision making in
conflict situations. Important in this decision making process is that the result depends not
only on the own decision but also on the behaviour of the opponent. So game theory is a
theory of social interactions between agents. Generally, these agents (decision makers) are
called players, which can be any kind of object such as individuals, groups, companies, con-
sumers, or any combination of these. In this general manner we can define a game as a formal
model of an interactive situation. The fundamental and formal conception of game theory
was first presented in John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s book ”Theory of Games
and Economic Behaviour” (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Nevertheless, many il-
lustrious predecessors worked on problems belonging to the so-called ”game theory”. For
example contributions of Bernoulli (1738), Cournot (1883), Bertand (1883), Borel (1924)
and Hotelling (1929) brought forward new ideas, rather than an independent theory.
The following three constituent parts are essential to setup a game:
1. the player (decision maker)
2. the rules of the game
3. the outcome (the payments made between the players: win, lose or draw)
The outcome of the game comprises that any possible combination players made, according
to the rules of the game, leads to a well-defined end-state (win, loss or draw) that termi-
nates the game. Associated with this state is a specified payoff, which is a real number
and reflects the acceptability of a players outcome. Each player wants to maximise his own
payoff. A crucial point is the precise specification of the rules of the game. In games like
chess or other parlour games, the rules are given in a very precise way, but in many social
interactions the rules are not given in such a precise way. Indeed, the kind of the precise
specification of the rules of the games allow a roughly differentiation between two broad ar-
eas (Ritzberger, 2002): cooperative games (or coalitions) and non-cooperative (or strategic)
games. In cooperative games players are able to make actionable contracts. This means that
the players do not necessarily have to cooperate, but that any cooperation is actionable by an
outside party such as a judge or the police. This thesis is focused on non-cooperative games,
in which players are unable to make actionable contracts outside of those specifically mod-
eled in the game. In non-cooperative game theory strategic choices have to be analysed. The
choices of the player are crucial to determine the outcome of a game. This does not mean
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that the players are not allowed to cooperate, but that cooperation must be self-enforced. In
summary, crucial points in non-cooperative game theory are:
• The rules are completely given.
• Each individual player is the unit and fundament of the decision.
• Any kind of liabilities are not available (unless they are defined by the rules of the
game).
Generally, each player has perfect knowledge of the game and of his opposition. This means,
the player knows in full detail the rules of the game as well as the payoffs of all other
players. A central assumption in most variants of classical game theory is that all players
are rational. A player is said to be rational if, whenever a player can choose between two
given alternatives, he will select the one that yields the greater payoff for him. Thus, during
the game a rational player always aims to maximize his own payoff. In this manner, game
theory will analyse how to play a game against rational opponents, or from a viewpoint
of the player, which is the best way for a rational assumed agent to play the game. In
non-cooperative game theory two different kinds of representation exist: the extensive form
(also called game tree) and the normal form (also called strategic form). The extensive
form (Gintis, 2000; Rieck, 2006) is a very common game form and contains a complete
description of how the game is played over time. This includes for example the order, in
which any finite number of players can make their actions, the information that players have
at the time of their actions, and the set of payoffs. Nevertheless, this thesis focuses on the
theory of normal-form games, which is the basic type of game studied in non-cooperative
game theory.
A game of the normal-form type consists of a list of players L and their strategies, and the
outcomes that result from each possible combination of choices. The outcome is associated
with a certain payoff for each player. To be more precisely, a normal form game consists of
a finite number of players, labeled with i = 1, 2, ..., I . Each player i can choose between
a certain strategy si from the pure-strategy space Si available for him. A pure strategy is a
specific action or move that a player has to do in every possible situation during the game.
The chosen strategies all define the games strategy profile given by s = (s1, s2, ..., sI). In
this tuple si is the strategy of the player i. A strategy profile s is an element of the strategy
space S = S1 × S2 × ... × SI . Associated with each player is an utility function ui, called
payoff function, which depends on the strategy profile s. This payoff function has the form
ui : S → R (1.1)
s 7→ ui(s).
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Then the vector u(s) = (u1(s), u2(s), ..., uI(s)) contains the expected payoff for all players
as a condition of the strategy profile s. The i-th component denote the payoff of the player
i, thus, a game in normal form has the structure (L, S, u(s)) where L = 1, 2, ..., I is a set
of players in a given strategy space S. This thesis is focused on normal-form games with
mostly just two players (I = 2, |S1| = |S2|). Here, usually payoff matrices are used.
Player 2
L (s12) R (s22)
Player 1 U (s11)
D (s21)
(
u1(s11, s12), u2(s11, s12) u1(s11, s22), u2(s11, s22)
u1(s21, s12), u2(s21, s12) u1(s21, s22), u2(s21, s22)
) (1.2)
The upper payoff matrix is a normal-form representation of a game in which each player
can choose between two strategies. For example, if player 1, also called row player, plays
U (up) and player 2, also called column player, plays L (left), player 1 receives u1(s11, s12)
and player 2 receives u2(s11, s12). In each entry of the matrix the first number represents the
payoff of the row player (in this case player 1) and the second number represents the payoff
of the column player (in this case player 2). In a normal-form game the players move simul-
taneously or rather the players do not observe the move of the other player before making
their own move and receive the payoffs as specified for the combinations of actions played
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1993; Luce and Raiffa, 1989; Osborne and Rubinsteink, 1994). Even
though in the previous explanation we exclude games, which have an infinite number of
players or an infinite number of strategies for each player, there is no need to exclude such
games. However, this thesis only deals with games with a finite number of strategies for
each player. Usually, the players have the possibility to choose between two different strat-
egy types called pure strategy and mixed strategy. A pure strategy defines a specific action
that a player i will follow in every possible situation with probability 1 in a game. A mixed
strategy of a player results of the probability distribution pi over the pure strategies Si. Here,
a player i chooses not directly a pure strategy si ∈ Si, but from a probability distribution pi
with the normalization pi =
∑
pi(si) = 1. In this case pi(si) is the probability to choose
strategy si. The payoff, e.g. of the column player using strategy j, can then be calculated
from
uj =
∑
k
uk(sj, sk) · pk(sk), (1.3)
where pk(sk) is the probability that the row player chooses the strategy k.
Another important concept in game theory is a concept called Nash equilibrium3. In game
theory the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950) is defined in the following way: Consider a game
3named after John Nash, who wrote, when he was 21 years old, his 27 page long dissertation, which earned
him a Nobel Prize in economics in 1994
1.2 Game Theory 11
situation between two or more players, in which no player has anything to gain by changing
only his own strategy. Thus, if each player has chosen a certain strategy and no player can
increase his payoff by changing his chosen strategy, while the other players keep theirs un-
changed, then the current set of strategy choices, with their corresponding payoffs, represent
a Nash equilibrium. Let us consider a general payoff matrix between two players with two
strategies (A and B) each.
( A B
A (a, a) (b, c)
B (c, b) (d, d)
)
. (1.4)
Then we have the following criteria:
1. A is a strict Nash equilibrium when a > c.
2. A is a Nash equilibrium when a ≥ c.
3. B is a strict Nash equilibrium when d > b.
4. B is a Nash equilibrium when d ≥ b.
Nash showed that in every finite normal-form game their exists at least one Nash equilibrium.
1.2.1.1 The Matching Pennies Game
Matching pennies is a zero-sum game with two players and with two strategies each. Each
player has two options (±1 or ↑↓). Player one wins if both players chose the same option,
otherwise player two wins. The players have to uncover their choices simultaneously. At
first each player shows either head (H) or tail (T) from a coin. If both are heads or both
are tails, player one wins, otherwise player two wins. The matching pennies game is quite
similar to the three strategy version - rock, paper, scissors. The rock, paper, scissors (RPS)
game is defined as follows: rock breaks scissors, scissors cut paper, and paper covers rock.
If both strategies are the same, the game is in a tie. The optimal RPS strategy, which means
one that is capable of competing with a perfect opponent, involves selecting rock, paper or
scissors at random (Szolnoki and Szobo, 2004; Reichenbach, Mobilia and Frey, 2007). All in
all two types of games are distinguished. In non-zero-sum games the total sum of all payoffs
is variable, and so both players may win (or lose). On the other hand zero-sum games are
games where the payoff is fixed. This means, whatever is gained by one player is lost by
the other player. Hence, the sum of payoffs to all players is zero. The corresponding payoff
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matrix for the matching pennies game is given by
( H T
H (−1, 1) (1,−1)
T (1,−1) (−1, 1)
)
. (1.5)
The matching pennies game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategy, because there is no
strategy set in which one of the players would want to switch if he knows the move of the
other player. The diagram 1.6 shows the dynamic of the game, by drawing the best responses
of the player in the given game matrix. The arrows show to the direction to which a player
drifts, if he knows, that the other player chooses the strategy in the row (or column) where
the arrow is placed.
H
H (−1, 1)
Player 2 // T
(1,−1)

T (1,−1)
Player 1
OO
(−1, 1)oo
(1.6)
Only if an entry of the matrix is touched by the arrowhead of both players, we have a Nash
equilibrium, because then no player has the need to switch from this strategy combination.
Whenever one arrow comes in and the other comes out, we have no equilibrium point. So if
player one chooses head, than player two will choose tail, which forces player one to choose
tail and again makes player two choosing head, and so on.
Although, the game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategy, there exists one equilibrium
in mixed strategies. Assuming player one chooses head and player two also chooses head
with the probability p, the expected payoff u for player one is given by
uH = p · (−1) + (1− p) · 1, (1.7)
according to Eq. 1.3. If player one chooses instead the strategy tail, he can expect
uT = p · 1 + (1− p) · (−1). (1.8)
To obtain the payment for player one of the entire game, we have to calculated the expected
payoff.
u(q, p) = q · uH + (1− q) · uT
= q · [p · (−1) + (1− p) · 1] + (1− q) · [p · 1 + (1− p) · (−1)]
(1.9)
1.2 Game Theory 13
Here we introduced the probability q that player one chooses the strategy “head”. To max-
imise the payoff u(q, p), player one has only influence on the probability q. So we get the
condition
∂u(q, p)
∂q
= 1− 2p
!
= 0, (1.10)
which yields p = 1/2. In the same way we get q = 1/2. The expected payoff is then
calculated with u(1/2, 1/2) = 1/2 · uH + 1/2 · uT = 0. So we conclude the matching
pennies game has only a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which each player chooses
his strategy with the probability p = q = 1/2, which yields an expected payoff zero. In
the published articles (Traulsen, Ro¨hl and Schuster, 2004a; Ro¨hl, Traulsen, Claussen, and
Schuster, 2007) of this thesis we describe a way, using methods from evolutionary game
theory, to win in this kind of “hopeless games” by exploiting stochastic fluctuations. The
matching pennies game belongs to an interesting class of games called cyclic games.
1.2.1.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
The famous prisoner’s dilemma (PD, a non-zero-sum game) and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma
(IPD) have been a rich source of research material since the last 50 years. The prisoner’s
dilemma belongs to the class of social dilemma games, and the publication of Axelrod’s book
“The Evolution of Cooperation” (Axelrod, 1984) in the 1980’s was mostly responsible for
bringing this research to the attention to other areas outside of game theory including evo-
lutionary game theory, evolutionary biology, networked computer systems, and facilitated
cooperation between opposing countries (Fogel, 1993; Axelrod and D’Ambrosio, 1995).
Currently, their exists a large literature base (see, for example, Boyd and Lorberbaum, 1987;
Maynard Smith, 1982; Poundstone, 1992; Axelrod, 1997; Schuster, 2002; Nowak, 2006).
Nevertheless, this is an on-going area of research. In this paragraph the prisoner’s dilemma
game is presented in respect to classical game theory. In the article (Traulsen, Ro¨hl and
Schuster, 2004a) this game is addressed in the context of evolutionary game theory. The
prisoner’s dilemma game is defined as a two-person-game, however, their exist also equiva-
lent more-person social dilemmas such as “Tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968).
The dilemma The classical prisoner’s dilemma is as follows: Two bandits are arrested
by the police. The police has insufficient evidence for a criminal conviction. Thus, they
separate both prisoners that they cannot exchange any information. Now, each prisoner
(player) is offered the same deal: Each player can choose between two strategies called
“cooperate” (C) and “defect” (D). “Cooperate” (C) means that he tells the police nothing (he
cooperates with the other prisoner), whereas “defect” (D) means that the prisoner tells the
police everything he knows. In this scenario we have then four possibilities:
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• Player one chooses C and player two chooses C. If both player’s plea of not guilty,
they will ultimately set free after two years.
• Player one chooses C and player two chooses D. In this case player one has to go a
long time, let us say five years, to prison, whereas player two is set free from prison.
• Player one chooses D and player two chooses C. Now player one is set free from
prison, whereas player two has to stay in prison for five years.
• Player one chooses D and player two chooses D. If both players defect, then they have
to stay in prison for a long time, say four years.
However, neither prisoner knows for sure what choice the other prisoner will make. So this
dilemma rises the question: How should the prisoners act?
To obtain the payoff matrix we build for each matrix entry the difference between the
maximal prison penalty (five years) and the value of the current penalty.
( C D
C (3, 3) (0, 5)
D (5, 0) (1, 1)
)
=
( C D
C (R,R) (S, T )
D (T, S) (P, P )
)
. (1.11)
The second matrix describes the general payoff matrix with sucker’s payoff S, punishment
P, reward R and temptation T.
We assume, one player thinks that the other player will cooperate. If he himself also
cooperates, he will receive a payoff of 3 for mutual cooperation. But if he chooses to defect,
he will receive a payoff of 5 for the temptation to defect. Hence, if he thinks the other player
will cooperate then the best decision is choosing to defect and, thus, to receive a payoff of
5. But what is the best choice if one player suspects that the other player will defect? If
he cooperates he receives the sucker’s payoff of zero. And if he defects both players would
receive the punishment for mutual defection with the payoff of 1. Thus, if he thinks the other
player will defect, the best decision for him would be to defect as well. Thus, all in all, the
best decision for the player is to defect, no matter what option the opponent chooses (Nash
equilibrium). Certainly, the same arguments hold also for the opponent. But, if both players
choose defect, they receive just a payoff of 1 each. Whereas would both player choose
mutual cooperation the outcome would be a payoff of 3 which is much more. Hence, there is
the following scenario that two cooperating players earn more than one individual (rational)
player, if both of them find a way to agree on mutual cooperation. This is the dilemma and
the reason for research activities in the prisoner’s dilemma game, is to find strategies that
facilitate mutual cooperation. The values we have used above, to demonstrate the game, are
not the only possible values, but they have to fulfill the conditions listed below.
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S < P < R < T
2R > S + T
(1.12)
The condition in the fist line guarantees that we actually have a social dilemma, whereas the
second condition ensures that the players do not play the game in that way, that they end up
with half the time being exploited and the other half of the time exploiting their opponent by
playing the strategy combination (C,D), or that one player cooperates and the other defects,
so that they can divide the reward (T + S)/2 when the game is finished.
In the repeated prisoner’s dilemma it was shown (Axelrod R. M. and Hamilton, W. D. 1981)
that the deterministic strategy “Tit for Tat” is a highly successful strategy, compared to a wide
range of other strategies. ”Tit for Tat” is a relative simple strategy. An agent using this strat-
egy will initially cooperate and then respond in such a way that he mimics the opponent’s
previous action. Nevertheless, “Tit for Tat” has the weakness that it is not fault-tolerant,
e.i., a single error made by an agent (or noise) can destroy the “Tit for Tat” cooperation.
A modified strategy called “Generous Tit for Tat” can correct mistakes. “Generous Tit for
Tat” means, whenever the opponent has cooperated, the agent himself also cooperates and
sometimes he even cooperates when the opponent has defected.
Another interesting strategy that may have long term advantages is “Pavlov”, the most
simple “win-stay-lose-shift strategy”. A player using the Pavlov strategy begins by cooper-
ating. Then he only cooperates if the opponent chooses the same strategy which he chose
himself in the previous turn. Otherwise, the Pavlov player will switch to the other strategy
(cooperation to defection and defection to cooperation). It was shown (Nowak and Sigmund,
1993) that Pavlov is a very robust strategy for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma that even can
outperform the “Tit for Tat” strategy in the presence of noise. Thus, the Pavlov strategy
has the following advantages against the “Tit for Tat” strategy: a) it can correct occasional
mistakes and b) it can exploit unconditional cooperators.
Whereas the prisoner’s dilemma as a model to study also the phenomenon of cooperation
has become something like a ’theoreticians’s playground’ in science, cooperation is also
more and more observed in nature. For example, altruistic behavior has been reported to take
place during the interaction of predator inspection in fishes (Milinski, 1987), food-sharing
in vampire bats (Wilkinson, 1984), viruses infection of bacteria (Turner and Chao, 1999)
or interaction of butterfly larvae with ants (Leimar and Axen, 1993). The butterfly larvae,
e.g., secrete a nutritious liquid. The ants yield the liquid and in turn provide the larvae with
protection against parasites and predators. The nutritious substance is costly to produce, thus
the larvae would profit from obtaining the ant’s safeguard without releasing the liquid. On
the other hand, ants may profit from getting only the food rewards without of defending the
larvae. So for both “players” at the first sight it seems to be better to defect. However, there
are several differences to the prisoner’s dilemma. For example, the rewards are asymmetric
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and the moves the players make are not necessarily simultaneous. However, the underlying
structure of interaction seems to be similar to the prisoner’s dilemma, even though, it is
presumably more complex.
1.2.2 From Classical Game Theory to Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory has its origin in the work of R.A. Fisher (The Genetic Theory of
Natural Selection (1930)). It was, first of all, developed as an application of the mathemati-
cal theory of games based on Darwin’s postulates to explore the social behavior of animals
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006; Sigmund, 2005; Weibull, 1995). This primary
work was mainly done by the biologist Maynard Smith4 (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973;
Maynard Smith, 1982). Evolutionary game theory explains strategic aspects in the evolution
of species due to the possibility that individual fitness may depend on population frequency.
This includes the following aspects observed in nature, co-evolution, population genetics,
speciation, extinction, diversity, procession, or the distribution and abundance of life. How-
ever, evolutionary game theory has also become of increasing interest to economists, sociol-
ogists, or anthropologists, based on the following facts:
• Evolution described by evolutionary game theory is a general concept not only related
to biological evolution. In this manner, evolution can be also understood as cultural
evolution, where evolution refers to changes in beliefs and norms over time.
• In classical game theory one assumes that players are rational. In contrast, in evolu-
tionary game theory the rationality concept is not needed to model biological or social
systems.
• In contrast to classical game theory evolutionary game theory is an explicitly dynamic
theory and therefore provides an important element, which is missing in the traditional
approach.
Presumably, the absence of rationality is the most important point between classical game
theory and evolutionary game theory. In contrast to classical game theory, in evolutionary
game theory trial and error processes rise strategies that can be selected by the evolutionary
(biological, social or cultural) process. In biology, for example, species and populations
represent strategy sets. Even a simple bacteria type can represent a certain strategy and would
be eliminated if, e.g., the strategy results to be less successful with the underlying population
dynamic. This is similar to the approach of solving “The Traveling Salesman ” problem
by using DNA computing methods instead of a complicated, artificial intelligence based,
4Originally he was an aeronautical engineer during the Second World War. However, after the war he became
a second degree in genetics under the well-known biologist J.B.S. Haldane.
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computer program. Just a heap of DNA is needed to represent lots of specific paths. The
general assumption that players choose strategies which lead to a Nash equilibrium requires
often high cognitive skills and rationality. Thus, in many situations these assumptions are
unrealistic. Therefore, if evolutionary game theory demonstrates that evolutionary processes
per se lead to this equilibrium in a played game, it would not by necessary to make such
a more unrealistic assumption concerning the rationality of the agents. This equilibrium
concepts are introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (1973) and are called “Evolutionary
Stable Strategies” which are closely related to the Nash equilibrium used in classical game
theory.
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1.3 Evolutionary Dynamics
1.3.1 Introduction
Equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game dynamics are based on John Maynard Smith
(Maynard Smith, 1982; Maynard Smith and Price, 1973) concept of an Evolutionary Sta-
ble Strategy (ESS) and are usually applied to evolutionary processes where players adopt
a strategy and then learn from its comparative success. These concepts are also important
in the study of the evolution of cooperation and altruism. As mentioned in the previous
paragraph, evolutionary game theory does not depend on rational agents. A population of
players interact in a game and each individual is associated with a fixed strategy. The player
(individual) is randomly chosen and interacts with other individuals. The cumulated payoffs
of the players are interpreted as (biological) fitness in this context. The population dynam-
ics forms then a natural selection process: strategies which are better matched in the given
environment (higher payoff) increase, otherwise (lower payoff) then decrease.
Let us consider a two-players game consisting of a population of X players. This means,
the population represents the strategy X. Nevertheless, because of mutation, there is also a
small quantity ǫ of invaders playing a different strategy Y.
( X Y
X (a, a) (b, c)
Y (c, b) (d, d)
)
. (1.13)
The frequency5 of X is then 1−ǫ. The payoff of X is greater than the one of Y if the following
condition holds:
a(1− ǫ) + bǫ > c(1− ǫ) + dǫ (1.14)
In the limit of ǫ→ 0 we obtain a > c. In the case that we have a = c we get b > d. Thus in
a two-persons game the strategy X is an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS)
1. if a > c or
2. if b > d (in the case of a = c).
This means a population X cannot be invaded by a small quantity of population Y invaders.
The conditions only hold for infinite large population sizes. However, in this thesis we con-
sider both infinite and finite population sizes. Furthermore, we also consider populations
with more than two strategies. For an n-persons game the ESS is defined as follows (Hof-
bauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006). The notation, introduced in paragraph 1.2.1, is
used.
5In the evolutionary context the term frequency refers to the relative abundance of a given population.
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1. Strict Nash equilibrium: Strategy Sk is a strict Nash equilibrium if
u(sk, sk) > u(si, sk) ∀i 6= k. (1.15)
2. ESS: Strategy Sk is an ESS if
u(sk, sk) > u(si, sk) ∀i 6= k (1.16)
or
u(sk, sk) = u(si, sk) and u(sk, si) > u(si, si) ∀i 6= k. (1.17)
3. Weak ESS: Strategy Sk is a weak ESS if
u(sk, sk) > u(si, sk) ∀i 6= k (1.18)
or
u(sk, sk) = u(si, sk) and u(sk, si) ≥ u(si, si) ∀i 6= k. (1.19)
4. Nash equilibrium: Strategy Sk is a Nash equilibrium if
u(sk, sk) ≥ u(si, sk) ∀i. (1.20)
It follows, for example, that if we have a strict Nash equilibrium, we also have an ESS. Thus,
all together the conditions imply the order: strict Nash equilibrium ⇒ ESS ⇒ weak ESS ⇒
Nash equilibrium. The concept of the evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS, is an important
part when studying evolutionary game dynamics. Maynard Smith and Price (Maynard Smith
and Price, 1973) introduced fixed (genetically encoded) strategies, but the same logic can be
applied to strategies, which are learned during the chronological sequence of an animals life.
In most models of the prisoner’s dilemma game the Tit for Tat strategy is profitable. Hence,
if the entire population employs the Tit for Tat strategy, it cannot be invaded by individuals
employing most other strategies. Therefore Tit for Tat is normally an ESS.
In evolutionary biology, fitness landscapes (Nowak and Sigmund, 2004; Nowak, 2006;
Wright, 1932) play a rule to describe and visualize the relationship between populations
(genomes) and reproductive success. The fitness landscape is based upon two concepts,
which are called the height and distance. The fitness of a specific gene sequence (≈ indi-
vidual, as each genotype is mapped to a certain phenotype ) is represented by the height in
the landscape, whereas the similarity between genotypes corresponds to the distance in the
landscape. This means that, e.g., genes (sequences) which are very similar are placed very
close to each other. The fitness landscape is then formed by the set of all possible geno-
typic variants (Fig. 1.1). In the case of a constant fitness landscape environment, adaption
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Figure 1.1: Evolution in changing environments is an important aspect of the theory of evo-
lution. Evolution is an adaptive process of a population that occurs on the fitness
landscape, here represented as bar charts. An adaptive process means that popu-
lations are able to find peaks in the fitness landscape. Here, dashed lines represent
the initial population, whereas solid lines represent populations after the evolu-
tionary process of mutation and selection. (a) The fitness landscape is constant,
while the population moves through a sequence space. (b) The fitness landscape
change, while the population moves through the sequence space. This is typical
for evolutionary game dynamics or frequency depending selection.
can often be viewed as an evolutionary optimization problem. In this manner an evolving
population usually climbs the hill upwards in the given fitness landscape. This is done by se-
lection and mutation processes until a local maximum is reached. If a population has evolved
to a local maximum it remains there until a new mutation opens a door to a higher fitness
peak. However, if the mutation rate is too high a population might not be able to climb a
peak or it happens that the population drifts away from a peak that it had already reached.
This would result in a reduced fitness of the individuals. The optimization process can be
described by mathematical methods (e.g. genetic algorithms) and it is often advantageous to
introduce a scalar fitness function and to describe the dynamics with a potential function. In
physics, this function corresponds to the potential energy of the system. While in physics
an energy function is defined by minimizing the energy (potential function), in biology the
fitness function is defined by maximizing the fitness. However, in reality this concept is of-
ten too simplified, because generally the fitness landscape changes as the population moves
across. Therefore, evolutionary dynamics deals with dynamical fitness landscapes (Wilke
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and Martinetz, 1999). This means that although the environment selects the adaptations, the
adaptations themselves can shape the environment. This includes that new peaks and valleys
might arise when a population moves through the fitness landscape. So far, we considered
single populations. The situation becomes easier, if we consider co-evolutionary systems
where several populations are involved, because each population can be a part of the other
ones fitness landscape. Examples for co-evolution include the evolution of a host species and
its parasites, predator-prey relationships, or the existence of mitochondria within eukaryotic
cells (endosymbiotic theory).
In evolutionary game dynamics the simplex is a tool often used to describe and visualize
evolutionary dynamics of frequency-depended selection (Fig. 1.2). A regular simplex Sn+1
is a convex hull of a set from n + 1 points xi in an n-dimensional Euclidian space Rn.
Sn = {~x ∈ R
n | 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, x1 + x2 + . . .+ xn = 1} (1.21)
The simplex consists of the interior, the faces and the vertices. The interior of the simplex is
defined by the set of all points xi with xi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
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Figure 1.2: Selection dynamics takes places on the simplex, which is a convex hull of a set
from n+1 points xi in an n-dimensional Euclidian space Rn under the condition
Σni=1xi = 1. The componets of the simplex are called interior, faces and vertices.
The faces are given by the set of all points with the condition that there exists at least one
point xi with xi = 0. The vertices are the set of all points xi with xi = 1 and xj = 0 for
all j 6= i. For example, the simplex S2 is represented by the closed interval [0, 1], whereas
the interior is then the open interval (0, 1) and the vertices a given by xi = {0, 1}. A given
population is, thus, represented by the vector ~x ∈ Rn with each given xi representing a
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specific strategy. In this manner the vertices represent the situation, that there is only one
strategy left, while all other strategies are extincted in the evolutionary process.
1.3.2 Replicator Dynamics
The replicator dynamics (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006; Page and Nowak,
2002; Schuster and Sigmund, 1983; Zeeman, 1980) describes the evolution of the frequen-
cies of strategies of populations and was first introduced for evolutionary game dynamics
from Peter Taylor and Leo Jonker (1978). The replicator equation is a differential equation
on the simplex Sn, and the population is assumed as infinitely large.
We assume a population consisting of n different types, i.e. strategies. We denote by
xi the frequency of the strategy i so that the structure of the population is given by the
vector ~x = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}. We denote by fi the fitness of type (strategy) i. The fitness
is usually a non-negative real number and a function of the composition of the population,
which describes the rate of reproduction. If the population is very large and if the individuals
meet randomly, so that the generations merge and are mixed in a perfect way, we demand
that the population ~x(t) is a time differentiable function. If we now consider a certain type
i with fitness fi(~x) and build the ratio x˙i/xi, we obtain, if the ratio is greater than zero, that
the specific type will increase in time. If the ratio is smaller than zero, the type will decrease
in time. Thus, x˙i/xi can be interpreted as a measure of evolutionary success of type i. With
〈f(~x)〉 =
n∑
i=1
xifi(~x) (1.22)
we define the average fitness (payoff) of the population. Because of the definition of the
fitness we have x˙i/xi ∝ fi(~x). Furthermore, it is plausible to assume that the average fitness
can not be unaffected in the evolutionary process of type i. The simplest approach is to
consider the difference between the fitness of type i and the average fitness fi(~x) − 〈f(~x)〉.
This leads to the replicator equation
x˙i = xi(fi(~x)− 〈f(~x)〉) i = 1, . . . , n. (1.23)
Obviously, the equation defines a frequency-dependent selection process, but it is important
to note, that the dynamics is described without any mutation. The replicator dynamics is
invariant of the simplex Sn that means, if ~x(t = to) ∈ Sn is given then ~x(t) ∈ Sn is also an
element of the simplex for all t ∈ R. If, for example, a trajectory starts in the interior, it will
always stay there. It will reach the boundary just in the limit for t → ∞. If the trajectory
starts from the face of the simplex, those strategies which are not represented on the simplex
will never appear. In consequence, the vertices of the simplex must be fixed points of the
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replicator dynamics. Of course, there can also be fixed points in the interior or face of the
simplex. Following Eq. 1.23 a population using strategy i will increase if the fitness (payoff)
of type i is greater than the average fitness (payoff) of the population, whereas, if the fitness
(payoff) of type i (strategy) is less than the average fitness, the strategy will decrease in time.
Often fitness functions fi are linear. In this case there exists then an n × n payoff matrix
P = (pij) such that fi(~x) =
∑
j pijxj = (P~x)i. The average payoff can then be written as
~x · P~x which yields the following replicator equation
x˙i = xi((P~x)i − ~x · P~x). (1.24)
To illustrate the concept of the replicator dynamics, we will derive the replicator equation for
the famous Hawk-Dove game (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973). In biology one interpreta-
tion of the game is that there exists a situation in which there is a competition for a shared
resource and the contestants can choose either conciliation (strategy dove (D)) or conflict
(strategy hawk (D)). The game is described by the following payoff matrix:
H D
H
D
(
0 6
2 4
) (1.25)
Let us assume a population divided into 2 types (strategies) H and D with the frequencies
x = x1 and x2 = 1 − x such that x1 + x2 = 1. In this context the vector ~x = (x, 1 −
x) represents the population shares. With PD (PH) we denote the payoff of an individual
(player) using strategy D (H) against the population ~x. For the payoffs we obtain
PH = 0 · x+ 6 · (1− x) = 6− 6x
PD = 2 · x+ 4 · (1− x) = 4− 2x.
(1.26)
Hence, the average payoff of the population is
〈P 〉 = x · (6− 6x) + (1− x) · (4− 2x) = 4− 4x2. (1.27)
If we assume that the population shares develop over time, i.e., that x is a function of time t,
and that the change in x, described by the time derivative x = x(t) = dx(t)/dt, is propor-
tional to the difference with the average fitness, we obtain the following equation
x˙ = dx(t)/dt = x · ((6− 6x)− (4− 4x2)). (1.28)
Equation (1.28) is the replicator dynamics for the Hawk-Dove game. The equation de-
scribes the population of “Hawks”-players [0, 1], which changes continously (described by
dx(t)/dt), and that this change is proportional to the difference of the fitness (payoff) at time
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t and the average fitness of the population. The critical points (Schuster, 1995) are given
from the condition x˙ = 0. We obtain
x˙ = 0 =⇒ x1 = 0, x2 = 1/2, x3 = 1. (1.29)
The stability of these fixed points are then determined by the Jacobian J , which is in this one-
dimensional case given by the derivation of x˙ and yields d
dx
x˙ = 2(1 − 6x + 6x2). Because
of
d
dx
x˙
∣∣∣∣
x=x1
=
d
dx
x˙
∣∣∣∣
x=x3
= 2 > 1 (1.30)
x1 and x3 are instable fixed points, whereas x2 is a stable fixed point (Fig. 1.3).
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Figure 1.3: Phase diagram for the Hawk-Dove game. The dynamic shows three different
fixed points x1 = 0, x2 = 1/2, and x3 = 1. For these x values the derivative
dx/dt is equal to zero, so that the population rates do not change in time.
In the case of x = 0 the whole population consists of hawk players. Their payoffs are
equal to the average payoff and, thus, nothing changes. However, this fixed point is not
stable and a slight agitation, e.g., a mutation resulting in a hawk player, increases the number
of hawk players because dx/dt becomes positive. This increase will continue until the fixed
point x2 = 1/2 is reached. The same logic holds for the fixed point x3 = 1, where the
population consists of only dove players. If the system is at the fixed point x = 1/2 a small
disturbance in either direction will bring the system back again to the state where half the
population consists of dove players. Thus, among the three critical points, only x = 1/2 is
a stable fixed point and the outcome is a stable coexistence of both types (hawk and dove
players). Recalling from the previous paragraph 1.2.1.1, in mixed strategies in the matching
pennies game x = (1/2, 1/2) is also a Nash equilibrium. Because in both cases P is a
2× 2 payoff-matrix, it follows that, first, P has at least one evolutionary stable strategy and,
second, the ~x = (x, 1− x) is an evolutionary stable strategy of P , if and only if x is a stable
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fixed point of the replicator dynamics. Generally, every symmetric bi-matrix game has a
symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Next we show that the mixed strategy (1/2, 1/2) is also an evolutionary stable strategy.
For this purpose we have to show that the condition
~x · P~x = ~y · P~x ⇒ ~x · P~y > ~y · P~y (1.31)
is always satisfied, whereas ~y = (y, 1− y) is an arbitrary strategy opponent. If we calculate
~x · P~x = ~y · P~x we obtain 3 = 3 which is obviously always satisfied. Hence, we have to
check if
~x · P~y > ~y · P~y (1.32)
for all ~y = (y, 1− y) 6= ~x. We obtain the following inequality:
0 > −(1− 2y)2, (1.33)
which is true for all y 6= 1
2
. Thus, ~x = (1/2, 1/2) is the unique evolutionary stable strategy.
1.3.3 Games in Finite Populations
Whereas a common method to study the evolutionary dynamics in games is through repli-
cator equations, which requires infinite populations, continuous time and complete mixing
of strategies, evolutionary dynamics in finite populations is no longer described by a deter-
ministic differential equation (Fudenberg, Nowak, Taylor and Imhof, 2006; Nowak, Sasaki,
Taylor and Fudenberg, 2004; Nowak, 2006; Taylor, Fudenberg, Sasaki and Nowak, 2004;
Traulsen, Clausen and Hauert, 2005; Traulsen,Clausen and Hauert, 2006; Traulsen, Pacheco
and Imhof, 2006). Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, which means that the popu-
lation size N is now given by an integer, requires a stochastic formulation, which is similar
to the familiar replicator dynamics used for infinite populations. Often differential equations
are easier to analyze. There exist a heap of analytical methods and also many numerical
methods have been developed to determine solutions with a given degree of accuracy. How-
ever, many important biological effects occur only in a stochastic context.
One of the simplest stochastic processes is the so-called “Moran process” (Moran, 1958).
This process was transferred to game theory by Martin Nowak (Nowak, Sasaki, Taylor and
Fudenberg, 2004). The Moran process is defined as follows (Fig. 1.4): Consider a population
with i individuals A and k = N − i individuals B, such that k + i = N is fixed. This
determines then a state space i = 0, 1, . . . , N . The probability of choosing an A individual
is given by i/N and the propability to choose a B individual is then 1− i/N = (N − i)/N .
For the Moran process we can formulate then four different scenarios.
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1. A is chosen for reproduction and A is chosen for elimination. After this event nothing
has changed.
2. A is chosen for reproduction and B is chosen for elimination. After this event the
variable i has increased to i+ 1.
3. B is chosen for reproduction and B is chosen for elimination. After this event nothing
has changed.
4. B is chosen for reproduction and A is chosen for elimination. After this event the
variable i has decreased to i− 1.
A
B
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Figure 1.4: The Moran process describes the stochastic evolution in a finite population of
constant size N . (a) Consider a homogeneous population of size N consisting of
A (white) and B (grey) individuals. At each time step two individuals are chosen.
Here, individual A is chosen for reproduction with a probability proportional to
its fitness, and a randomly chosen individual B is picked for elimination. (b)
The offspring A was replicated and has replaced the individual B. Therefore, the
population size does not change in time.
The Moran process determines then a birth-death process. Which means that in every
single time step (stochastic event), the state variable i can either increase by one, stay the
same, or decrease by one. Thus, the stochastic transition matrix (Eq. 1.34) , P = (pij) for
this one-dimensional Markov process, is trigonal and of the type (N + 1)× (N + 1).
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P =


1 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
p1,0 1− p1,0 − p1,2 p1,2 . . . 0 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 0 . . . pN−1,N−2 1− pN−1,N−2 − pN−1,N pN−1,N
0 0 0 . . . 0 0 1


(1.34)
We donate by pij the probability of moving from state i to state j. The process has two
absorbing states
p0,0 = 1 p0,i = 0 ∀i > 0
pN,N = 1 pN,i = 0 ∀i < N.
(1.35)
The existence of these two absorbing states implies that no coexistence of A and B individ-
uals is possible and that this happens, although there is no particular selection process. The
occurrence that, altough there is no selection, one individual will displace all other individu-
als and take over the whole population is called neutral drift. Besides these absorbing states
all other states (i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1) are transient. The process will remain in transient only
for a certain limited time. Thus the question arises, what the fixation probability in this birth
death process, i.e. the probability to reach an absorption in state N when starting in state i,
could be. Let xi be the probability to reach the absorption state N, when starting with i A
individuals. This yields
x0 = 0
xi = pi,i−1xi−1 + pi,ixi + pi,i+1xi+1 i = 1, . . . , N − 1
xN = 1.
(1.36)
If we are in state 0, it is not possible, because of x0 = 0, to reach state N . The probability to
end up in state 0 when starting from state i is then given by 1− xi. The solution of Eq. 1.36
is given by Karlin and Taylor (1975):
xi =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 γk
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 γk
(1.37)
with γi = pi,i+1/pi,i−1. The fixation probability is valid for any birth death process, such
as neutral drift, constant selection or frequency-dependent selection. For example, if we are
interested in the probability that a single A individual will become the forefather of the whole
population. Then Eq. 1.37 yields for state i = 1
ρA = x1 =
1
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 γk
. (1.38)
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We denote by ρA the probability that a single A individual will spread over the whole popu-
lation that contains N − 1 B individuals. In the same manner we obtain the probability that
one single B individual will spread and reaches fixation in a population of A individuals by
ρB = 1− xN−1 =
∏N−1
k=1 γk
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 γk
=
1
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏N−1
k=j γk
. (1.39)
As an example we consider now the fixation probabilities ρB and ρB for constant selection,
in particular for neutral drift. Neutral drift comprised, that both A and B individuals shall
have the same fitness. In the case that pi,i−1 = pi,i+1, which means that A and B individuals
have the same fitness, we have γi = 1. Therefore, all products are reduced to one and we
obtain ρA = ρB = x1 = 1/N . This leads to the result that in the case that there are i many A
individuals
xi = i/N ∀i = 0, . . . N. (1.40)
Conversely, the probability that N − i B individuals reach fixation and eliminate all A indi-
viduals is
1− xN−i = (N − i)/N ∀i = 0, . . .N. (1.41)
If we calculate the ratio of the fixation probabilities we obtain
ρB
ρA
=
N−1∏
k=1
γk. (1.42)
It follows from Eq. 1.42 that if the product is smaller one, we have ρB < ρA (otherwise we
have ρB > ρA). This means, that a single A mutant becomes fixed in B population is more
likely than vice versa.
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1.4.1 Stochastic Gain in Population Dynamics
The article “Stochastic gain in population dynamics” (Traulsen, Ro¨hl and Schuster, 2004a)
deals with an evolutionary game of two populations with different strategies and objectives
analyzing the payoff in the context of a noisy environment. Whereas in the absence of noise
the system evolves to a stable Nash equilibrium, in the presence of noise the system moves
away from the Nash equilibrium. If one of the players in the game can adjust its adaptation
rate relative to the opponents play, it is shown that this generates a constant benefit per time
for the adaptive player.
To get a better insight we first discuss asymmetric conflicts. Then we introduce adaptive
learning rates, which is one of the key ideas in this manuscript. We proceed then with the
stochastic replicator dynamics and the “stochastic gain effect”.
Consider two players A and B. We assume that Player A wants to meet player B, while
player B tries to avoid this meeting. If they choose the same way, they will meet and this is
what A wants. Otherwise, they do not meet and this is good for B (Fig. 1.5). In this context,
both players have different roles which can be mathematically described by different payoff
matrices for the players. Nevertheless, this framework allows us to analyze the influence of
different learning mechanisms in such systems.
A
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Figure 1.5: Asymmetric conflict. Player A wants to meet B, but player B do not like to meet
A and therefore he tries to avoid this meeting. Which way (strategy) should A or
B choose? Here A is anxious to synchronise, whereas B tries to do exactly the
opposite of A.
The battle of the sexes, also called matching pennies game, is an example of an asymmetric
conflict (Dawkins, 1976, Maynard Smith, 1982). The game gives some insight into the
mating habits of certain animals. A thorough treatment of the game can be found in Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998 and Schuster, 2002 (see also the paragraph 1.2.1.1). In the matching
pennies game two players A and B place a penny on the table. If the pennies match, A wins
B’s penny, otherwise B wins A’s penny. If we consider now two populations X and Y which
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play this game against each other, we obtain the following replicator equations
x˙ = ηx x(π1(y)− 〈πx(y, x)〉)
y˙ = ηy y(π1(x)− 〈πy(x, y)〉). (1.43)
Here πx (πy) is the payoff of player X (Y ). With 〈πx(y, x)〉 (〈πy(x, y)〉) we denote the
average payoff of population X (Y ). For ηx = ηy = 1 we have a Hamiltonian system
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) with the following constant of motion
H(x, y) = −2 ln[x(1− x)]− 2 ln[y(1− y)]. (1.44)
In this case the trajectories oscillate around the Nash equilibrium at (1/2, 1/2) yielding an
average payoff of zero for each population. The key idea is then to introduce an adaptive
learning rate (here denoted for the population X)
ηx = η0 (1− tanh[αx(〈πx〉 − 〈πy〉)]) (1.45)
with η0 as the base selection rate, the perception ability α and the average payoff difference
〈πx〉 − 〈πy〉 of both interacting populations. In the case of α→ 0 we yield η0, which means
that no adaptive learning occurs. For α→∞ and (〈πx〉−〈πy〉) > 0 we obtain 2η0. However,
for an intermediate α we have shown that such a learning mechanism can stabilize the mixed
Nash equilibrium in the matching pennies game (Traulsen, Ro¨hl and Schuster, 2004a). For
that purpose we used a stochastic replicator dynamics (Fudenberg and Harris, 1992):
x˙i = xi(πi − 〈π〉) + ξi (1.46)
by introducing an additive Gaussian noise term ξi with variance 1. Combining Eq. 1.43 with
Eq. 1.46 we get
x˙ = ηx(x, y) x(π1(y)− 〈πx(y, x)〉) + ξx
y˙ = η0 y(π1(x)− 〈πy(x, y)〉) + ξy. (1.47)
This is a stochastic replication equation with an adaptive learing rate. Here, disturbances
can drive the system away from the Nash equilibrium. We have shown that the fluctuations
ruled by small amplitudes of Gaussian noise increase the capability of learning of one popu-
lation and therefore increase the payoff beyond the Nash equilibrium. This is an interesting
extension of the replicator dynamics to adaptive learning rates and the fundamental role of
the noise in the dynamics. We demonstrated this effect, called “stochastic gain effect” also
in non-cyclic games, in particular for the noise in the prisoner’s dilemma game with adaptive
selection rate.
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1.4.2 Stochastic Gain in Finite Populations
Evolutionary game theory describes population dynamics under frequency dependent selec-
tion. Frequency dependent selection means, that the fitness of an individual (phenotype6)
is dependent on the relative frequency of other individuals (phenotypes) in the population.
Frequency dependent selection can be subdivided in positive and negative frequency depen-
dent selection. Whereas in the first case the fitness of an individual increases as it becomes
more common, in the latter one the fitness of an individual decreases as it becomes more
common, i.e., less frequent individuals have a higher fitness than common ones (Sigmund
and Nowak, 1999; Maynard Smith, 1982; Nowak, 2006; Nowak and Sigmund, 2004). Usu-
ally, such systems are described by deterministic replicator equations (Hofbauer and Sig-
mund, 1998; Taylor and Jonker, 1978), which are defined for infinite large population sizes.
However, this article addresses the problem of finite populations. Using methods from statis-
tical physics, a connection between replicator equations and related microscopic processes
can be established (Helbing, 1993; Helbing, 1996; Traulsen, Clausen and Hauert, 2005;
Traulsen, Clausen and Hauert, 2006). Nevertheless, for bi-matrix games details of the mi-
croscopic process can affect macroscopic properties, and, furthermore, the finiteness of a
population can lead to further important effects (Traulsen, Clausen and Hauert, 2005).
We will now explain the model and the underlying selection dynamics, used in the pub-
lished articles, by giving detailed background information. At first, we discuss the Moran
process in the context of “weak selection”. Then, we show that for large populations the
dynamics of the system can be approximated by a Fokker-Planck equation. Finally, we show
that in the limit for infinite population sizes both microscopic processes (the Moran process
as well as the “local update rule”) lead to replicator equations.
The Moran process from population genetics (Moran, 1958) can be used to describe
frequency-dependent selection dynamics in finite populations. In 1.3.3 we stressed the dy-
namics with one evolving population as usually done in evolutionary game theory. Neverthe-
less, we consider two interacting populations X and Y, both of size N. The two populations
play then the matching pennies game against each other, i.e., an X individual interacts with
an Y individual. At this juncture each individual can choose between two strategies 0 and
1. For example an X0 individual can play against an Y0 or Y1 individual. We denote by Xi
that an individual from population X chooses the strategy i = {0, 1}. The Nash equilibrium
only evolves, if both populations play the mixed strategy (1/2, 1/2) (see paragraph 1.2.1.1
6The phenotype is the set of all observable physical or biochemical characteristics of an organism, as deter-
mined by both, genetic makeup and environmental influences. For our purpose, it is sufficient to identify
this term with an individual.
1.4 Survey of the Publications 32
and 1.3.2). The payoff matrix is then given by
( Y0 Y1
X0 +1,−1 −1,+1
X1 −1,+1 +1,−1
)
. (1.48)
The average payoff πX0 of each of the X0 individuals depends on the number of Y0 indi-
viduals, j0, and on the number of Y1 individuals, j1 = N − j0. We obtain
πX0 = 1 ·
j0
N
− 1 · N−j0
N
πX1 = −1 ·
j0
N
+ 1 · N−j0
N
.
(1.49)
The expression j0
N
is the probability to play with a j0 opponent, whereas N−j0N refers to the
probability to play against a j1 opponent. Conversely, the payoffs of the Y population depend
on the number of X0 and X1 individuals, i0 and i1 = N − i0, which yield
πY0 = −1 ·
i0
N
+ 1 · N−i0
N
πY1 = 1 ·
i0
N
− 1 · N−i0
N
.
(1.50)
The fitness of X and Y is a combination of background fitness and the payoff and is given
by
fXi = 1− w + wπ
X
i i ∈ {0, 1}
fYi = 1− w + wπ
Y
i i ∈ {0, 1}.
(1.51)
Here, w ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that measures the intensity of selection and specifies the
contribution of the game to the fitness (Nowak, 2006). The limit w → 0 is called “weak
selection”. For example, if w = 0, the game plays no rule for the fitness. The case w = 1
is called “strong selection”, which means that in this case the fitness is totally determined by
the expected payoffs, because the fitness of an individual is then identical to its payoff. Note,
that in the selection dynamics of the Moran process an individual is chosen proportional to
its fitness for reproduction. Here, we have to distinguish between payoff and fitness.
The transition probabilities in the X population (similarly for the Y population) are, thus,
given by
T i→i+1X =
ηx
2
fX0 i
fX0 i+ f
X
1 (N − i)
N − i
N
(1.52)
T i→i−1X =
ηx
2
fX1 (N − i)
fX0 i+ f
X
1 (N − i)
i
N
(1.53)
T i→iX = 1− T
i→i+1
X − T
i→i−1
X . (1.54)
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Here ηx is the adaptive learning rate, which is given by
ηx = η0(1− tanh(αx ·∆π)). (1.55)
With ∆π = 〈πX〉−〈πY 〉we denote the difference between the average payoffs. The adaptive
learning rate plays a crucial rule. If, for example, the average payoff of population X is
greater than the one of the Y population, the adaptation of the strategies becomes slower.
Why should the X population learn so fast, when everything goes well? On the other side,
when the X population has a smaller average payoff than the Y population, it is useful to
adapt in a speedy manner. This principle is similar to the so-called “win stay, lose-shift”
rule. We found, that an adaptive population under the influence of internal noise (which
arises naturally from the finiteness of a population) can gain an increased average payoff in
transient phases.
Besides of the Moran process we also stressed a different microscopic update mechanism,
which is based on the pairwise comparison of individuals called “local update rule”. The
main difference between the local update rule and the Moran process is, that the former one
is based only on local information, i.e. the payoff difference between the interacting individ-
uals, whereas the Moran process in not defined in a local way. We showed then that if one
population using the local update rule plays against a population using the Moran process,
the latter wins. In an information theoretical point of view these result are understandable.
Next, we show that in the case for large population sizes N , the dynamics of the system
can be approximated by a Fokker-Planck equation (Gardiner, 2003; Schuster, 2002; Traulsen,
Clausen and Hauert, 2005). For this purpose we start from the master equation
P τ+1(j)− P τ (j) = P τ (j − 1)T+j−1 + P
τ (j + 1)T−j+1 − P
τ(j)T−j − P
τ(j)T+j . (1.56)
We denote with P τ (j) the probability to be in state j and time τ . By introducing the system
size parameter N and the van Kampen’s notation (Gardiner, 2003) x = j/N , t = τ/N and
T±j → T
±(x) we can rewrite the probability density as
ρ(x, t) = NP τ (j). (1.57)
Together with equation 1.56 this yields
ρ(x, t+N−1)− ρ(x, t) = ρ(x−N−1, t)T+(x−N−1) + ρ(x+N−1, t)T−(x+N−1)
−ρ(x, t)T−(x)− ρ(x, t)T+(x). (1.58)
Because the limit for large N is of interest, we now make a Taylor expansion at x and t. For
the probability density we obtain
ρ(x, t+N−1) ≈ ρ(x, t) +
∂
∂t
ρ(x, t)
1
N
ρ(x±N−1, t) ≈ ρ(x, t)±
∂
∂x
ρ(x, t)
1
N
+
∂2
∂x2
ρ(x, t)
1
2N2
(1.59)
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and for the transition probabilities we get
T+(x−N−1) ≈ T+(x)−
∂
∂x
T+(x)
1
N
+
∂2
∂x2
T+(x)
1
2N2
T−(x−N−1) ≈ T−(x) +
∂
∂x
T−(x)
1
N
+
∂2
∂x2
T−(x)
1
2N2
. (1.60)
The terms in Eq. 1.58 which are independent of 1/N are canceled. We now rearrange the
terms depending on their order of 1/N , whereas we will neglect terms that are higher in the
order of O(N2). Starting with the terms of order 1/N we find for the left hand side the term
∂
∂t
ρ(x, t). On the right hand side, we obtain
−ρ(x, t)
∂
∂x
T+(x) + ρ(x, t)
∂
∂x
T−(x)− T+(x)
∂
∂x
ρ(x, t) + T−(x)
∂
∂x
ρ(x, t)
= −
∂
∂x
[
T+(x)− T−(x)
]
ρ(x, t). (1.61)
We now select the terms of order 1/N2. On the right hand side we get then(
∂
∂x
ρ(x, t)
)(
∂
∂x
T+(x)
)
+
1
2
ρ(x, t)
∂2
∂x2
T+(x) +
1
2
T+(x)
∂2
∂x2
ρ(x, t)
+
(
∂
∂x
ρ(x, t)
)(
∂
∂x
T−(x)
)
+
1
2
ρ(x, t)
∂2
∂x2
T−(x) +
1
2
T−(x)
∂2
∂x2
ρ(x, t)
=
1
2
∂2
∂x2
[
T+(x) + T−(x)
]
ρ(x, t). (1.62)
Bringing all together, the equation now becomes
∂
∂t
ρ(x, t) = −
∂
∂x
[
T+(x)− T−(x)
]
ρ(x, t) +
1
2
∂2
∂x2
T+(x) + T−(x)
N
ρ(x, t). (1.63)
By using the notation a(x) = T+(x)− T−(x) and b(x) =
√
1/N [T+(x) + T−(x)] we can
write the equation as
∂
∂t
ρ(x, t) = −
∂
∂x
a(x)ρ(x, t) +
1
2
∂2
∂x2
b2(x)ρ(x, t). (1.64)
Equation 1.64 (1.63) is a Fokker-Planck equation with the drift term a(x) and the diffusion
term b(x), which describes the deterministic time evolution of the nonequilibrium probability
distribution.
Now, the Itoˆ-calculus (Gardiner, 2003; Schuster, 2002; Traulsen, Clausen and Hauert,
2005) can be applied to obtain a stochastic differential equation, called Langevin equation.
In this scope the Fokker-Planck equation mentioned above corresponds to the stochastic
differential equation given by
x˙ = a(x) + b(x)ξ. (1.65)
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Here ξ is uncorrelated Gaussian noise. In the limit of N → ∞ the diffusion term b(x) ∝√
1/N vanishes and a deterministic differential equation
x˙ = T+(x)− T−(x), (1.66)
which is the replicator equation of the system, is found. For the Moran process (Traulsen,
Clausen and Hauert, 2005) we get, here for the X population, by setting the adaptive learning
rate η = 1,
x˙ = αx · (π0(x)− 〈π(x)〉), (1.67)
with α = 1/(1−w
w
+ 〈π(x)〉). Equation 1.67 is the adjusted replicator dynamics (Maynard
Smith, 1982). Note, that α depends on the average payoff of the population. For the local
update rule we obtain for the X population
x˙ = β x · (π0(x)− 〈π(x)〉), (1.68)
with β = w/∆πmax = const. In contrast to the adjusted replicator dynamics β affects the
timescale only.
In summary, both processes converge in the limit for N → ∞ to replicator equations.
The local update mechanism leads to the standard replicator dynamics, whereas the Moran
process leads to the adjusted replicator dynamics.
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1.4.3 Impact of Fraud on the Mean-Field Dynamics of
Cooperative Social Systems
The question of cooperation is crucial for understanding evolution. For example, genomes,
cells, multicellular organisms, social insects and presumably any arbitrary group of interact-
ing individuals, this includes the human society, are all based on cooperation (Axelrod, 1984;
Nowak, 2006b; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). Cooperation means that an individual must dis-
miss their selfish behavior by helping another individual. Darwin’s principle says that evo-
lution is a constant struggle for survival and this implies that individuals should not support
others at a cost to themselves (Maynard Smith, 1982). Nevertheless, in reality individuals are
often willing to forgo some of their reproductive potential and support others, even if such
an action reduces fitness in the short run. However, it might be possible that such behavior
increases the survival chances in the long run.
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Figure 1.6: Cooperation can be based on direct reciprocity or on indirect reciprocity. (a) Co-
operation can be based on repeated interactions with the same individual, which
is called direct reciprocity, and means that an individual A helps B and (for same
reason) B is then also willing to help A. (b) Two different strategies called “up-
stream” and “downstream”, which are both based on their reputation, are ex-
amples for indirect reciprocity. Upstream reciprocity means that a person (B)
is getting help from one person (A), and then helps another person (C). In this
case the first recipient B thanks another person C for what A did. Downstream
reciprocity means, that an individual, here A, helps another individual B and re-
ceives than, because of this action, help from a third person, here C. In this case
the person A is thanked by someone, here C, who observes and approves the
action.
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In this context, one of the main questions is, how natural selection encourages unselfish
behavior. One approach towards the understanding of this phenomenon has been made in
terms of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation, which includes kin selection (Hamil-
ton, 1963; Frank, 1998), i.e., if the donor and the recipient of an altruistic act are genetic rel-
atives, group selection (Maynard Smith, 1976; Wilson, 1975; Traulsen and Nowak, 2006),
which means that competition is also between groups and not only between individuals,
and network reciprocity (Herz, 1994; Othsuki, Hauert, Lieberman and Nowak, 2006; Lind-
gren and Nordahl, 1994; Perc, 2006; Schweitzer, Behera and Mu¨hlenbein, 2002; Szabo´ and
To˝ke, 1998; Szabo´ and Hauert, 2002; Santos, Rodrigues and Pacheco, 2005; Santos and
Pacheco, 2005) , which means that clusters of cooperators outcompete defectors. However,
for the purpose of the thesis two mechanisms called direct reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Axel-
rod, 1984; Hauert and Schuster, 1997) and indirect reciprocity (Brandt and Sigmund, 2004;
Brandt and Sigmund, 2005; Brandt and Sigmund, 2006) are of special interest. The latter
one is quite interesting, because this mechanism distinguishes humans from all other living
species on earth (Alexander, 1987).
Direct reciprocity (Fig. 1.6 a) treats the following problem. Assuming an evolutionary
game in which are repeated encounters between the same two individuals, whereas each of
them can choose between the strategies cooperate or defect. Now it is possible that under
certain conditions a strategy of mutual cooperation may be favored by both players even if
it pays each player in the short term (see prisoner’s dilemma game in paragraph 1.2.1.2). In
this manner, direct reciprocity can lead to the evolution of cooperation if the probability p
of another encounter between the same two individuals exceeds the cost c to benefit b ratio
of the altruistic act p > c/b. Indirect reciprocity (Fig. 1.6 b), which can be subdivided in
upstream reciprocity and downstream reciprocity, is defined as act, where the return for a
favor comes from someone different than the recipient of the benefaction. This is a typical
phenomenon in human societies. Indirect reciprocity is complex. For example, consider
an individual B (see Fig. 1.7) which has defected in the previous round of an evolutionary
game. What should individual A do now? In general, individual A has two possibilities.
First, he can punish individual B for his behaviour. Second he can help B as an altruistic
act. In the article “Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring” M. Nowak and K.
Sigmund (1998) introduced a theoretical framework to model indirect reciprocity, which
does not require that the same two individuals ever meet again, by a mechanism, which they
called image scoring to stress this kind of problems.
The article “Impact of fraud on the mean-field dynamics of cooperative social systems“
is based on the image scoring model, which works as follows: Consider an evolutionary
game with two types of individuals (strategies) called discriminators and defectors. In this
population each individual has the option to help one another or not. Random pairs of in-
dividuals are chosen, of which one is the donor of some altruistic act, whereas the other is
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Figure 1.7: Indirect reciprocity has to address the following problems. Assuming that indi-
vidual B has defected in a previous action and as a result of his action he now has
a lower reputation. Then, the question is, if A should help B and what should be
done in this case with the reputation of individual A. (a) Individual A does not
help B. Thus, B is punished for previous defections. Why should the reputation
of A then be reduced? (b) Individual A helps B, but helping defectors can desta-
bilize cooperation. So, why should the reputation of A increase, although B is a
defector?
the recipient. The donor can cooperate and help the recipient, but he has to pay for this act
a cost c. Then the recipient receives a benefit of value b (with b > c). If the donor does not
help, he can save the cost, so that both individuals receive nothing (zero payoff). Now, each
player is labeled with a flag called image score. In a simple case the image score has only
the two values 0 or 1. A player with the image score 1 is labeled as good, whereas a player
with an image score 0 is labeled as bad. It is essential that all other players can see the image
score and can use this information for future decisions. A defector never helps, whereas
discriminators help only players with the image score 1. The question arises, how a player
can get or lose his good reputation. An individual can only change his reputation status, if
he was chosen as a donor. If he then cooperates, his image score becomes 1. Otherwise,
if he defects, the image score becomes 0. Thus, the image score depends only on the last
move of a player as a donor. For a defector the information about the image score does not
matter, because he always defects. If he was chosen as a donor his image score becomes bad.
However, at the beginning all players are labeled as good, in this case the defector has the
possibility to increase his payoff, if he is chosen as a recipient. Then it was shown (Nowak
and Sigmund, 1998) that individual selection can favour cooperative strategies, targeted to
recipients who have helped others in the past. Furthermore, they showed that the probability
q of knowing the image score of the recipient must exceed the cost to benefit ratio of the
altruistic act q > c/b to fulfill the emergence of evolution of cooperation.
In this manner, the discriminators behavior can lead to cooperation, which is of more ben-
efit for the individuals than in the case, that they act as independent individuals. However,
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this can only occur for q > c/b which is a very important corollary to generate cooperation.
Otherwise, the population can always be exploited by selfish individuals (defectors) who
benefit even more by not taking part to the community and just earning its benefits. Never-
theless, it is important to note that both, cooperators as well as defectors, are fair players and,
thus, are respectable “people”, because there is no specific rule that says, e.g., that defectors
have to help. Selfish behavior is not criminal and defectors are no cheaters.
This is the starting point to introduce a new type of player, which we will call scammer (or
fraud). A “scammer strategy” is defined as follows: If a scammer is chosen as a donor, his
behaviour is the same as that of a discriminator, i.e., he helps other individuals with image
score 1 and denies help for those who are labeled as bad (0). In the latter case his reputation
becomes also bad. However, scammers bluff by manipulation of their own reputation in the
way that they always seem to have a good reputation for other players. In this manner he
always yields the benefit b if he is chosen as a recipient and the donor is not a defector.
Furthermore, a scammer, if he is chosen as a donor, does not pay the cost for cooperation.
We then analysed this extended model by introducing a detection probability α. In the case
that the scammer is detected, he has to pay a high penalty ρ. We analysed both, a constant
detection probability and an adaptive detection probability. In the case of a constant detection
probability we show that below a certain value of α = α1 the dynamics is determined by
scammers. And, furthermore we showed that above a certain value of α = α2 scammers
become extinct. In this case the dynamics is then determined by discriminators and defectors
only. However, in the intermediate parameter region for the detection probability α1 < α <
α2 we observed, that fraud can even enhance cooperation. Nevertheless, for a lower detection
probability α real systems would break down. One possibility to avoid the breakdown of the
system is given by using a high detection probability. However, for an adaptive detection
probability, we observe, because of the existence of a nontrivial fixed point in the interior of
the simplex, that the dynamics can lead to the coexistence of discriminators, defectors and
scammers.
Our model offers two interesting prospects. On the one side, it allows to study evolution
of cooperation in the context of fraud, which delivers a new insight in cooperative systems.
On the other side, we have now for the first time the possibility to analyse and describe the
rule of cheating in such reputation systems. We note that classical evolutionary game theory
does not sufficiently model this ’living on the expense of others’, which is typically feasible
during a limited amount of time only.
The evolution of cooperation does not seem to be a logical consequence of Darwin’s prin-
ciples that favour the strong and selfish individuals. But also, several mechanisms exist that
can maintain cooperation. Nevertheless, if these mechanisms are too costly they are only
maintained, if there is a way for scammers to persist. In this case, it is the cheating that
ultimately stabilizes the evolution of cooperation.
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In conclusion, our results show that in indirect reciprocity discriminators might benefit
from coexistent scammers that fake their reputation, depending on their detection probability
and on the cost to benefit ratio. When the probability to detect scammers vanishes with the
fraction of scammers (in the case of adaptive detection probability), a certain amount of
fraud is always found in the system. Thus, a limited presence of scammers in the population
can increase cooperative behavior in our model. We show, that complex cooperative systems
become vulnerable to self-interested scammers when a critical number is exceeded or when
they cannot be detected at low abundance.
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We introduce an extension of the usual replicator dynamics to adaptive learning rates. We show that a
population with a dynamic learning rate can gain an increased average payoff in transient phases and
can also exploit external noise, leading the system away from the Nash equilibrium, in a resonancelike
fashion. The payoff versus noise curve resembles the signal to noise ratio curve in stochastic resonance.
Seen in this broad context, we introduce another mechanism that exploits fluctuations in order to
improve properties of the system. Such a mechanism could be of particular interest in economic
systems.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.93.028701 PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.40.Ca, 87.23.Cc, 89.65.Gh
Game theory [1] describes situations in which the suc-
cess or payoff of an individual depends on its own action
as well as on the actions of others. This paradigm can be
applied to biological systems, as evolution through natu-
ral selection can be viewed as an optimization process in
which the fitness landscape changes with the state of the
adaptive populations [2]. Evolutionary game theory fo-
cuses mainly on systems with a single fitness function for
all individuals, which is identified with the payoff func-
tion of a game [3–5]. In nature, often different popula-
tions with different ambitions interact with each other, as
shoppers and sellers [6], attackers and defenders [6], or
males and females [5]. Here the payoff functions are
different for the interacting populations. A mean-field
description of such asymmetric conflicts is given by the
coupled replicator equations [4,5,7]. These equations have
a very rich dynamical behavior and can even display
Hamiltonian chaos [8,9]. In previous work [3–5] it has
been tacitly assumed that both populations have the same
adaptation mechanisms. But it seems to be natural that
different mechanisms are applied by the interacting
populations, e.g., different adaptation rates. Here we ana-
lyze such systems for the case that both populations have
slightly different adaptation mechanisms. We assume that
one population can control its own adaptation rate. This
alters the velocity when the system is approaching the
stable Nash equilibria [10] in strategy space, leading to an
increased average payoff.
In real systems, fluctuations disturbing the system are
to be expected. Such disturbances can arise from a variety
of effects, e.g., errors of the players [11], deviations from a
perfectly mixed population, or immigration of individu-
als with different strategy distributions. So far, stochastic
extensions to the replicator dynamics have mainly been
analyzed in the context of equilibrium selection [12,13].
Here we show that a population with an adaptive learning
rate can obtain an increased payoff if these fluctuations
are present. For small noise intensities the average payoff
increases, while very large fluctuations can no longer be
exploited, leading to a decrease of the average payoff.
This recalls the stochastic resonance effect [14–17],
where the signal to noise ratio of a system is improved
for intermediate noise intensities. In contrast to the usual
stochastic resonance, a periodic force is not involved
here, making the mechanism more similar to coherence
resonance [18]. Seen in this broader context, we introduce
another mechanism that exploits fluctuations in order to
improve the performance of the system.
We consider two adaptive species X and Y— each with
different strategies—that are involved in a repeated
game. Both populations have different objectives de-
scribed by payoff matrices Px and Py. The fraction of
individuals xi that adopt a certain strategy i grows propor-
tional to the relative payoff of the strategy i; the same
holds for Y. In the presence of noise, this coevolution can
be described by the coupled replicator equations
_xi  xixxi  hxi  xi ;
_yi  yiyyi  hyi  yi ;
(1)
where x and y are the learning rates of the populations.
We assume for simplicity that the noise i is Gaussian
with autocorrelation hki t	ljs	i  2ijklt s	 as in
Ref. [12]. We also follow Ref. [12] in choosing reflecting
boundaries. The payoffs are defined as xi  Px 
 y	i,
hxi  xT 
 Px 
 y, and similarly for y.
We extend the usual replicator dynamics by introduc-
ing adaptive learning rates as
x  1 tanhx		; (2)
where 	  hxi  hyi is the time dependent differ-
ence between the average payoffs of the populations and
x  0 is a ‘‘perception ability’’ of the population. In
order to maintain the basic features of the replicator
dynamics, the learning rate must be a positive function
with hi  1, which is ensured by Eq. (2). For x > 0 the
population X learns slower if it is currently in a good
position; otherwise, it learns faster. The value of x
determines how well a population can assess its current
state. The adaptive learning rate leads to a faster escape
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from unfavorable states, while on the other hand the
population tends to remain in preferable states. Other
choices for x which ensure these properties mentioned
above will not alter our results. In the following, we focus
on a setting where only one population has an adaptive
learning rate x as in Eq. (2).
The noise introduced above drives the system away
from the Nash equilibrium and leads for small amplitude
to a positive gain of the population with an adaptive
learning rate, whereas for large noise amplitudes the
fluctuations smear out the trajectories in phase space so
strongly that they can no longer be exploited. Hence, we
expect an optimal noise effect for intermediate values of
. In order to be able to compare the payoffs of both
populations, we assume that the dynamics starts from the
Nash equilibrium.
As a first example, we consider the zero-sum game
‘‘matching pennies’’ [3,19]. Here both players can choose
between two options 1. Player one wins if both players
select the same option and player two wins otherwise.
The game is described by the payoff matrices
Px 
1 1
1 1

 Py: (3)
The replicator equations follow from Eqs. (1) and (3) as
_x 2xx2y 1	x 1	  x;
_y 2yy2x 1	y 1	  y; (4)
where x  x0 and y  y0. Let us first consider the zero
noise limit in the case x  y  1. As for all zero-sum
games, i.e., Px  PTy , the system (1) without noise be-
comes Hamiltonian and has a constant of motion [20].
Here the constant is given byHx; y	  2 lnx1 x	
2 lny1 y	. The trajectories oscillate around the Nash
equilibrium at x  y  1=2. Hx; y	 is connected to the
temporal integral of the average payoff hxi 
xt	T 
 Px 
 yt during a period with hxi > 0,
Z t1
t0
hxidt  Hx0;
1
2
	 H1
2
; 1
2
	
4
; (5)
where x; y	  x0; 12	 at t0 and x; y	  12 ; x0	 at t1.
If we include adaptive learning rates (2) into the sys-
tem, we find _Hx; y	  2 tanhx			  0, vanish-
ing for x  0. Hence, adaptive learning rates dampen
the oscillations around the Nash equilibrium, and the
trajectories in the x y plane spiral towards the Nash
equilibrium where hxi  hyi  0 (see Fig. 1). In addi-
tion, this leads to an increased payoff of one population.
As the matrices (3) describe a zero-sum game, it is
sufficient for a population if it knows its own current
average payoff h	i  2hxi.
Numerical simulations for x > 0 show that the tem-
poral integral of the payoff becomes* Z t1
t0
hxidt
+
x0;y0	
  1
8
Hx1; y1	 Hx0; y0	: (6)
The averaged initial value Hx0; y0	 can be calculated asR
1
0 dx0dy0Hx0; y0	  8. For t! 1 the system relaxes to
the Nash equilibrium where H  8 ln2. Hence, we find for
the average cumulated payoff with h
R1
t0
hxidtix0;y0	  1
8
8 ln2 8	  0:307. Numerical simulations yield
0:308 0:005 independent of . We conclude that a
population can increase its average payoff if it has an
adaptive learning rate x > 0 and if the game does not
start in the Nash equilibrium. The adaptation parameter 
influences only the time scale on which the Nash equilib-
rium is approached.
Small noise intensities drive the system away from the
fixed point and the population with the adaptive learning
rate gains an increased payoff. If the noise amplitude 
becomes too large, the trajectories will be smeared out
homogeneously over the positive (gray) and negative
(white) payoff regions in phase space (Fig. 1). This im-
plies that the average gain of population one decreases to
zero; cf. Fig. 2. Although the average payoff is very small
even for the optimal noise intensity, the cumulated payoff
increases linearly in time. This means that for long times
the gained payoff accumulates to a profitable value.
As a second application we analyze the effect of adap-
tive learning rates and noise on the prisoner’s dilemma.
We use the standard payoff matrix [22]
Px 

3 0
5 1

 Py; (7)
where rows and columns are placed in the order ‘‘coop-
erate’’ and ‘‘defect.’’As this game is not a zero-sum game,
the population with the adaptive learning rate must be
able to compare its own average payoff with the oppo-
nent’s average payoff. The replicator dynamics of this
system is determined by Eqs. (1) and (7),
_x  xxx 1	1 y	  x;
_y  yyy 1	1 x	  y: (8)
x
y
t
 
〈Π 
(t) 
〉 
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FIG. 1. Matching pennies: Comparison between the behavior
of a population with a constant learning rate [i.e., x  0 (thin
lines)] and a population with an adaptive learning rate [per-
ception ability x  10 (thick lines)]. The opponent has in both
cases a constant learning rate y  1. Left: Trajectories in
strategy space. Arrows show the vector field of the replicator
dynamics. Population X has positive (negative) average payoff
in gray (white) areas. Right: Time development of the average
payoff of the population X. The adaptive learning rate increases
the time intervals in which the corresponding population has a
positive payoff, dampening the oscillations around the Nash
equilibrium [21].
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There is a stable fixed point in the Nash equilibrium x 
y  0 where both players defect and an unstable fixed
point for mutual cooperation, i.e., x  y  1.
The average payoff difference under the influence of
noise is similar as in matching pennies. Small fluctua-
tions lead the system slowly away from the Nash equilib-
rium and tend to increase the payoff. If the fluctuations
are too large, they disturb the population with adaptive
learning rates and the payoff decreases again (see Fig. 3).
Interestingly enough, here too much noise even leads to a
decreasing payoff difference.
In order to describe the ‘‘stochastic gain’’ effect ana-
lytically, we introduce a simplified model. A lineariza-
tion of Eq. (8) around the stable Nash equilibrium leads
for constant learning rates to _x  xx x and _y 
yy y. We now analyze a game in which the repli-
cator dynamics is given by these linear equations and
include adaptive learning rates based on the payoffs for
the prisoner’s dilemma. With 	  5x y	 the adap-
tive learning rate x becomes x  1 tanh5x
y	  1 5x y	 for ; x; y 1. The simplified sys-
tem can be viewed as a small noise expansion of the
prisoner’s dilemma, where the trajectory stays close to
the Nash equilibrium. For y  1 the simplified noisy
replicator equations read
_x x 0xx y	  x; (9a)
_y y y; (9b)
where 0  5. The effect of different constant learning
rates is discussed in Ref. [23]. The mechanism we intro-
duce here is more intricate, as the adaptive learning rate
leads to a dynamical adjustment of the learning rate, and
the average of x  1 0x y	 over all possible strat-
egies is y  1.
Equation (9b) describes an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck pro-
cess [24]; here the dynamics is restricted to 0  y  1.
The Fokker-Planck equation [25] for py  pyy; tjy0; t0	,
_p y 
d
dy

ypy 
2
2
d
dy
py

; (10)
has the stationary solution psy N yey2=2 , where
N 1y 
R
1
0 e
y2=2dy. We find the mean value hy	i as
hyi 
Z 1
0
dypyy 
1 e2	

p
erf1

	 : (11)
y is a correlated stochastic process which appears in
Eq. (9a) as a multiplicative noise. Numerical simulations
indicate that we may neglect the stochastic nature of y
and replace it by hyi for small . This leads to an approxi-
mated Fokker-Planck equation for px  pxx; tjx0; 0	,
_p x 
d
dx

ax	px 
2
2
d
dx
px

; (12)
where ax	  x x0x hyi	. Since x is (similarly to
y) also restricted to 0  x  1, we find the stationary
solution
psx N x exp

 x
2
2
 2
0x3
32
 
0hyix2
2

(13)
with the normalization constant N x. Since x is typically
of the order of  for  1, the term x2=2 is finite.
Therefore, we can expand Eq. (13) for 0  1 and obtain
by expanding hxi again an analytical expression for
h	i  5hxi  hyi	,
h	i  50 d
d0
hxi  50

2
2
 31 	2  21 	

5
3
 7
6
21 	



2
3
 
	
; (14)
where   1

p
erf1=	 and   e1=
2
. The asymptotics of Eq. (14) can be computed as h	i  0=242	 for  1 and
0 1 2
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FIG. 3. Prisoner’s dilemma: Average payoff difference of a
population with an adaptive learning rate against a population
with a constant learning rate for different noise intensities. The
negative payoffs arise from the fact that we have x <y for
x < y (	t  0:01, y  0, averages over 2 104 initial con-
ditions and 2 104 time steps).
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FIG. 2. Matching pennies: Average payoff of a population
with an adaptive learning rate against a population with a
constant learning rate under the influence of noise for different
noise intensities (y  0, averages over 2 104 initial condi-
tions and 2 104 time steps; see [21] for further details).
P H Y S I C A L R E V I E W L E T T E R S week ending9 JULY 2004VOLUME 93, NUMBER 2
028701-3 028701-3
Publications 46
h	i  05
2
 35
6
	2 for  1. We stress that this sim-
plified system which consists of a stable fixed point with a
linear adaptive learning rate in the presence of noise is the
simplest possible model that describes the stochastic gain
effect. Figure 4 shows a comparison between the analyti-
cal payoff difference Eq. (14) and a simulation of
Eqs. (9a),(9b).
To summarize, we have introduced an extension to the
usual replicator dynamics that modifies the learning rates
using a simple ‘‘win stay–lose shift’’ rule. In this way, a
population optimizes the payoff difference to a competing
population. This simple rule leads to a convergence to-
wards the mixed Nash equilibrium for the game of
matching pennies [26]. Even in games with stable Nash
equilibria as the prisoner’s dilemma, transient phases can
be exploited, although the basins of attraction are not
altered, as, e.g., in Ref. [23]. Weak external noise drives
the system into the transient regime and leads to an
increased gain for one adaptive population.
In conclusion, we have found a learning process which
improves the gain of the population with an adaptive
learning rate under the influence of external noise.
Fluctuations lead to an increased payoff for intermediate
noise intensities in a resonancelike fashion. This phe-
nomenon could be of particular interest in economics,
where interactions are always subject to external distur-
bances [6,13,27].
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Flexible learning rates can lead to increased payoffs under the influence of noise. In [A. Traulsen, T. Ro¨hl,
and H.G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 028701 (2004)], we have demonstrated this effect based on a repli-
cator dynamics model which is subject to external noise. Here, we utilize recent advances on finite population
dynamics and their connection to the replicator equation to extend our findings and demonstrate the stochastic
gain effect in finite population systems. Finite population dynamics is inherently stochastic, depending on the
population size and the intensity of selection, which measures the balance between the deterministic and the
stochastic parts of the dynamics. This internal noise can be exploited by a population using an appropriate
microscopic update process, even if learning rates are constant.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s 87.23.-n, 05.45.-a, 02.50.Ey
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary biology considers the dynamics of systems in
which the potential to produce offspring differs among the
individuals in a population. Individuals with higher fitness
produce more offspring and spread in the population. In the
simplest cast, different types of individuals have different fit-
ness and one expects that the fittest type spreads fastest. Evo-
lutionary game theory describes population dynamics under
frequency dependent selection, i.e. when the fitness depends
on the types and frequencies of other types in the population
[1–4]. Traditionally, such systems are described by determin-
istic replicator equations [5–7], which corresponds to a mean
field approximation in physics. Using techniques from statis-
tical physics, a connection between replicator equations and
related microscopic processes can be established [8–12].
Usually, evolutionary game theory addresses the dynamics
within a single population and describes how different types
spread in this population [13–17]. In structured populations,
the microscopic update rule that determines how individual
players switch strategies can significantly change the macro-
scopic dynamics [17–19]. Well mixed populations without
any structure can be described by the replicator equation. Dif-
ferent microscopic dynamics lead to different forms of the
replicator equation in the limit of infinite populations. How-
ever, usually this affects timescales and does not alter the sta-
bility of fixed points and the qualitative dynamics.
Bi-matrix games (or asymmetric conflicts) address situa-
tions in which two different populations with different pref-
erences interact, which is the generic case in economics. In
biology, the two populations can be males and females or de-
fenders and attackers of a territory [1]. In social and eco-
nomic systems, one could think of employees and employ-
ers or shoppers and sellers [20]. Usually, evolutionary game
theory considers the competition between different individu-
als within a population (e.g. between timid and aggressive
males). But one can also compare the average success of one
population to the average success of the second population.
In these systems, slight changes in the details of the replicator
dynamics can change the qualitative dynamics and the stabil-
ity of fixed points [1]. In a previous paper, we have shown that
one population that changes its adaptation or learning rate ac-
cording to its current situation can in the long run outperform
a population with a constant learning rate in the presence of
external additive noise [21].
Here, we investigate this“stochastic gain” effect in interact-
ing finite populations and show that even internal noise that
naturally arises from the finiteness of a population can be ex-
ploited in this way. We start by showing that the effect can
be found in finite populations not subject to external noise
and demonstrate that our results are valid with different mi-
croscopic update mechanisms. Subsequently, we show exam-
ples that an adaptive learning rate (which forms the basis of
the “stochastic gain” in Ref. [21]) is not necessary at all if
both populations employ different microscopic update mech-
anisms. In this case, specific microscopic update rules are
more successful.
II. THE BASIC MODEL
To address the stochastic gain effect in finite populations,
we consider two interacting populations X and Y , both of
size N . Each individual can choose between two strategies 0
and 1. The payoff in the X population depends on the number
of different strategic types in the Y population and vice versa.
The payoffs for a single interaction can be written as
( Y0 Y1
X0 a00, b00 a01, b01
X1 a10, b10 a11, b11
)
. (1)
Thus, a X0 individual interacting with an Y0 individual ob-
tains the payoff a00 whereas its interaction partner obtains
b00. The average payoff piX0 of each of the X0 individu-
als depends on the number of Y0 individuals, j0, and on the
number of Y1 individuals, j1 = N − j0. It is given by
piX0 = a00j0/N + a01(N − j0)/N . Similarly, we have piX1 =
a10j0/N + a11(N − j0)/N . In the Y population, the pay-
offs depend on the number of X0 and X1 individuals, i0 and
i1 = N − i0, which leads to piY0 = b00i0/N + b10(N − i0)/N
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and piY1 = b01i0/N+b11(N− i0)/N . The payoffs now deter-
mine the probability that a new strategy is adopted. Different
ways to incorporate this strategy dynamics are possible [22–
24].
Here, we follow [10] and use a microscopic update mech-
anism based on the pairwise comparison of individuals we
call “local update rule”: One focal individual is selected at
random and compares its payoff to a randomly selected role
model from the same population. It adopts the strategy of the
role model with a probability proportional to the payoff dif-
ference. Thus, the probabilities to change the number of X0
individuals from i to i± 1 are given by
T i→i±1X = ηx
(
1
2
±
w
2
piX0 − pi
X
1
∆pimax
)
i
N
N − i
N
. (2)
Since the payoffs depend on y, these transition probabilities
depend on the number of different types of the Y -population.
The learning rate ηx determines how likely it is to change a
strategy in the X population. For ηx ≪ 1, it is very unlikely
that an individual switches the strategy. In the extreme case
of ηx = 0, the population does not evolve. For the maximum
value ηx = 1, evolution within the X population proceeds
fastest. The intensity of selection w controls how likely it is
to adapt to a better (or worse) strategy [10, 16]. For w ≪ 1,
selection is weak and the probability to switch to a better strat-
egy is only slightly higher than the probability to switch to a
worse strategy. For w = 1, the probability to adopt a better
strategy reaches one if the payoff difference piX0 −piX1 reaches
the maximum possible payoff difference ∆pimax. With prob-
ability T i→iX = 1−T
i→i+1
X −T
i→i−1
X , the number of X0 and
X1 individuals remains constant. In an equivalent way, we
obtain
T j→j±1Y = ηy
(
1
2
±
w
2
piY0 − pi
Y
1
∆pimax
)
j
N
N − j
N
. (3)
The transition probabilities Eqs. (2) and (3) define a birth-
death process in each of the two populations on the state space
{i, j} = {0, 1, . . . , N}. For large populations, the dynamics
of the system can be approximated by a Fokker-Planck equa-
tion with the drift term T i→i+1 − T i→i−1 and the diffusion
term
√
[T i→i+1 + T i→i−1] /N [10]. Applying the Itoˆ calcu-
lus [25–27], this description is equivalent to a stochastic dif-
ferential equation for the fraction of X0 individuals in the X
population, x = i/N , and the fraction of Y0 players in the Y
population, y = j/N ,
x˙ = ηx
w
∆pimax
(
piX0 − pi
X
1
)
x(1− x) +
√
ηx
x(1− x)
N
ξ
y˙ = ηy
w
∆pimax
(
piY0 − pi
Y
1
)
y(1− y) +
√
ηy
y(1− y)
N
ξ.
(4)
Here, ξ is white Gaussian noise with the variance 1. The mul-
tiplicative noise term vanishes for N → ∞ and at the bound-
aries.
Having introduced a specific microscopic update mecha-
nism, we now concentrate on a particular game for which the
stochastic gain effect is most striking. We consider the payoff
matrix
( Y0 Y1
X0 +1,−1 −1,+1
X1 −1,+1 +1,−1
)
. (5)
This game is known as “matching pennies” (in economics) or
“battle of the sexes” (in biology), see [1, 10, 28] for a biolog-
ical motivation of this game. The X population is better off if
it uses the same strategy as the Y population, i.e. a X0 player
obtains the highest payoff when matched with a Y0 player and
a X1 player obtains the highest payoff when matched with a
Y1 player. Individuals from the Y population obtain the high-
est payoff when paired with a different strategy in the X pop-
ulation, i.e. Y0 with X1 and Y1 with X0. In the limit N →∞,
we obtain from Eq. (4) the usual replicator equation. In this
case, the system cycles on closed trajectories around a neutral
fixed point at (x, y) = (1/2, 1/2). Due to the symmetry of the
game, both populations obtain the same average payoff. The
same holds under the influence of external noise [21]. In the
case of a finite population, the microscopic update mechanism
is a natural source of internal noise. Considering the symme-
try between Eqs. (2) and (3), both populations have the same
average payoff even in this case.
III. ADAPTIVE LEARNING RATE
Usually, the learning rates ηx and ηy have the same fixed
value. Szolnoki and Szabo´ have analyzed a system in which
different players have different, but fixed values of η [29].
Here, we assume that the rate with which a population adapts
to a new situation is different depending on the average suc-
cess of a population. If the overall success is unsatisfactory,
one is more likely to try something new. In biology, a popula-
tion with small average fitness might decrease in size, leading
to a smaller population that adapts faster. We follow our previ-
ous work based on the replicator equation [21] and introduce
an adaptive learning rate ηx for the X population. This rate
ηx increases above a base value η0 when the average payoff
difference to the Y population is negative. It decreases be-
low η0 when the payoff difference is positive. In our case, the
adaptive learning rate is given by
ηx = η0(1− tanh(αx ·∆pi)). (6)
Here, ∆pi = 〈piX〉 − 〈piY 〉 is the difference between the av-
erage payoffs, which are defined by 〈piX〉 = (piX0 · i + piX1 ·
(N − i))/N and 〈piY 〉 = (piY0 · j + piY1 · (N − j))/N . The
parameter η0 is set to 12 and αx determines how sensitive this
change in the learning rate is. If the X population has a larger
average payoff than the Y population, adaptation of strate-
gies becomes slower. If the X population has a smaller av-
erage payoff than the Y population, adaptation of strategies
becomes faster. Thus, we introduce an adaptive learning rate
that follows the “win stay — lose shift” paradigm in the com-
parison between the two populations.
Our system is reduced to the one analyzed in [21] in the
limit of N → ∞. However, the nature of the noise is very
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Average payoff difference of a population with
an adaptive learning rate ηx = 0.5− 0.5 tanh(αx ·∆pi) compared to
a population with a constant learning rate of ηy = 0.5 in the match-
ing pennies game using the local update rule, see text. (a) Payoff
differences are shown for a constant population size of N = 100 and
for different α. The average payoff difference is small if the inten-
sity of selection w is small otherwise the population with an adaptive
learning rate has a higher average payoff. The stochastic gain ef-
fect becomes more pronounced with increasing α. (averages over
R = 2 · 104 random initial conditions in the interior until the maxi-
mum time T = 105 or until the absorbing boundaries of the system
are reached). (b) Payoff differences for three different population
sizes for fixed α = 1.0. The total payoff decreases with higher pop-
ulation size N because the noise intensity decreases. In the limit of
N →∞we obtain the equation for the stochastic replicator dynamic
without external noise. Thus the payoff difference converges to zero.
Averages over R = 7000 random initial conditions until the absorb-
ing boundaries are reached or until the maximum time T = N · 103.
different: In [21], the noise is additive and arises from an ex-
ternal source. Here, the noise is multiplicative and arises in-
ternally from the system. In Fig. 1, we demonstrate that for
finite populations, the stochastic gain effect can still be found
with the additional twist that now internal noise is exploited.
The noise intensity is controlled by w: A small w implies that
the system is close to neutral selection where all individuals
have the same fitness. In this case, it is difficult to increase
payoffs solely by changing the rate of adaption. A large w
means that the system is very unlikely to leave the area close
to the point (x, y) = (0.5, 0.5) where both populations have
the same payoff. Thus, there exists an optimal w for which
the payoff difference becomes highest. For N → ∞, the in-
ternal noise vanishes and the effect is not longer present. We
have started with a random initial condition and simulated the
system until one strategy in one population has reached ex-
tinction. Fig. 1 shows the mean payoff difference averaged
over a large number of such runs.
Next, we show that this result does not depend on the details
of the microscopic update mechanism. A standard approach
for game dynamics in finite populations is the frequency de-
pendent Moran process [22, 30–32]. In each of the two pop-
ulations, the following update process takes place: One indi-
vidual is selected at random, but proportional to fitness. We
define fitness f as a convex combination of a background fit-
ness set to 1 and the payoff, e.g. fX0 = 1− w + wpiX0 . Since
our payoffs vary between -1 and 1, the intensity of selection w
has an upper limit (w < 0.5) to ensure that fitness is positive.
The selected individual produces identical offspring, which
replaces a randomly chosen individual. The transition proba-
bilities in the X population are thus given by
T i→i+1X =
ηx
2
fX0 i
fX0 i+ f
X
1 (N − i)
N − i
N
(7)
T i→i−1X =
ηx
2
fX1 (N − i)
fX0 i+ f
X
1 (N − i)
i
N
, (8)
where we have introduced a factor 1/2 to make both consid-
ered processes identical for w → 0. Similar equations hold
for the Y populations.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Average payoff difference of a population
with an adaptive learning rate ηx = 0.5− 0.5 tanh(αx ·∆pi) against
a population with a constant learning rate of η = 0.5 in the match-
ing pennies game using the frequency dependent Moran process in
both populations.The parameter values in (a) and (b) are identical to
Fig. 1, but in the Moran process shown here, the maximum inten-
sity of selection is given by w = 0.5. Qualitatively, the stochastic
gain effect does not depend on the details of the update mechanism
in finite populations: With α increasing from α = 0.0 the payoff
advantage of the adaptive population increases. However, there is a
an optimal α for which the stochastic gain effect is most pronounced
(see text). With increasing N the system approaches a deterministic
replicator system and the intrinsic noise vanishes. Thus, increasing
N leads to smaller payoff differences. Moreover, the finite size effect
of a negative payoff difference for low intensity of selection vanishes.
In the Moran process strategies with higher fitness are more
likely to be selected for reproduction, whereas selection at
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death is the same for all strategies. Thus, the average abun-
dance of fitter strategies increases over time. The frequency
dependent Moran process is reduced to the adjusted replica-
tor dynamics in the limit N → ∞ [10]. For the adjusted
replicator dynamics it is known that the game defined by the
payoff matrix Eq. (5) has an asymptotically stable fixed point
at (x, y) = (0.5, 0.5) [1]. Thus, it is not a priori clear that the
stochastic gain effect can be observed even in the frequency
dependent Moran process. However, Fig. 2 shows that a vari-
able rate of adaptation also leads to an increased payoff in this
process.
To illustrate the effect further, we consider the probability
density for the different states of the system. Fig. 3 shows that
for αx = 0, this probability density is symmetric in the state
space (i, j) ∈ ({0, . . . , N}, {0, . . . , N}) leading to a vanish-
ing average payoff difference. With increasing αx the time
the system spends in states in which the X population has the
higher average payoff, increases. However, if αx becomes
too large, then adaptation of the X population is so strong
that random fluctuations no longer take the system to states
in which the payoff difference is large. Thus, there exists an
optimal αx for which the payoff difference becomes highest
for any given w.
IV. COMPETITION OF UPDATE MECHANISMS
So far, we have assumed that both populations use the same
update mechanism and that only the adaptive learning in one
population is different. However, one can also consider two
different update mechanisms in the two populations. This
is motivated by the following observation [10]: The local
update mechanism leads to the standard replicator dynamics
x˙ = x(pix − 〈pi〉) in the limit N →∞. The frequency depen-
dent Moran process leads to the adjusted replicator dynamics
x˙ = x(pix −〈pi〉)/〈pi〉 in this limit. The only difference is that
the right hand side is divided by the average payoff. However,
this can be interpreted as a change in the learning rate, as a
large average payoff leads to slow dynamics and a small aver-
age payoff to fast dynamics. Thus, we expect that when a pop-
ulation using the frequency dependent Moran process com-
petes with a population using the local update mechanism, the
former will perform better without any external change in the
rate of adaption. Fig. 4 shows that this is actually the case.
This result becomes more pronounced for higher intensities
of selection. However, in the processes discussed here, there
is an upper limit in the intensity of selection. To address this
issue, one has to resort to different microscopic update mech-
anisms [24, 33].
This shows that an increased average payoff can be ob-
tained from a different microscopic update mechanism. In
principle, this could lead to higher level selection: If competi-
tion does not only occur within populations, but also between
groups of individuals [32], then groups using a more success-
ful update mechanism will perform better. In this way, a more
successful update mechanism might be selected in the long
run.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Payoff distribution and stationary distribution
for the Moran process in the strategy space spanned by the state space
for a constant population size of N = 100 are shown encoded by a
color scale where bright colors indicate high values. (a) The average
payoffs 〈piX〉 = (piX0 ·i+piX1 ·(N−i))/N of the adaptive populations
(X) are shown. In the bottom left and top right areas (green) the
payoffs of the adaptive population (X) are positive, whereas in the
bottom right and top left areas (red) the payoffs are negative. The
adaptive population can obtain a higher stationary probability density
in the bottom left and top right areas, leading to the stochastic gain
effect. (b) The stationary distribution for α = 0.0 is symmetric.
The population dynamics drives the system around the fixed point of
the replicator dynamics at (x, y) = (0.5, 0.5). (c) With increasing
α = 1.0 the system is driven to the interior. Now the areas where the
average payoff for the adaptive population is higher shows a larger
stationary probability density. (d) Same as in (c) but the stationary
distribution for α = 10.0 is shown. Increasing α further leads to a
smaller probability density in the areas where the payoff difference is
high and, thus, the payoff difference decreases again for large α. For
all figures, parameter values are N = 100, R = 5 · 105, w = 0.35,
T = N · 103.
V. DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated that the stochastic gain effect first
discussed in [21] can also be found in finite populations. In
this case, the internal noise arising from the finiteness of the
population can be exploited. The intensity of this noise can be
controlled by the intensity of selection, which determines how
likely it is that individuals adopt better (or worse) strategies.
Recently, there has been an increased interest in stochastic
effects in evolutionary games. Perc et al. have shown that in
spatial games, coherence resonance can be observed [34, 35].
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Average payoff difference of a population
using the Moran process against a population using the local update
rule for two different sizes of population N . Both populations are
nonadaptive with a constant learning rate of η0 = 0.5. Independent
of the selection pressure w the population using the Moran process
obtains a higher payoff. Thus, the stochastic gain effect can also be
observed in the absence of variable learning rates. The total payoff
decreases with higher population size N . In the limit of N → ∞
both dynamics result in the equation for the deterministic replicator
dynamic, without external noise, thus, the payoff difference tends to
zero. Parameter values are N = 500, 1000, T = N · 103, R =
15000.
It has been shown that noise can even enhance cooperation
in many circumstances [36–38]. Internal as well as external
noise have been considered in these systems and it has been
shown that the nature of these disturbances can be very differ-
ent [39, 40].
The existence of the stochastic gain effect without any
adaptive learning rates (ηx = ηy = 0.5) is based on the ap-
plication of different microscopic update rules. This effect
could have potential applications for economy where traders
try to improve their payoff by exploiting fluctuations. A fi-
nite number of interacting agents can be a source of noise in
these systems. Clever local update rules that use more and
more information about the market and other traders can be
advantageous in these systems. Our results highlight the im-
portance of the detailed consideration of microscopic update
mechanisms, as they can significantly alter the macroscopic
dynamics of a system.
Acknowledgments
We thank Jorge M. Pacheco for helpful comments on an
earlier version of this manuscript. A.T. acknowledges support
by the “Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina”
(Grant No. BMBF-LPD 9901/8-134).
[1] J. Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982).
[2] M. A. Nowak and K. Sigmund, Science 303, 793 (2004).
[3] M. A. Nowak, Evolutionary Dynamics (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006).
[4] G. Szabo´ and G. Fa´th, Physics Reports (2007).
[5] P. D. Taylor and L. Jonker, Math. Biosci. 40, 145 (1978).
[6] E. C. Zeeman, Lecture Notes in Mathematics , 819 (1980).
[7] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and Pop-
ulation Dynamics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1998).
[8] D. Helbing, Physica A 193, 241 (1993).
[9] D. Helbing, Theory and Decision 40, 149 (1996).
[10] A. Traulsen, J. C. Claussen, and C. Hauert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95,
238701 (2005).
[11] A. Traulsen, J. C. Claussen, and C. Hauert, Phys. Rev. E 74,
11901 (2006).
[12] F. A. C. C. Chalub and M. O. Souza, math.AP/0602530 (2006).
[13] M. A. Nowak and K. Sigmund, Nature 355, 250 (1992).
[14] F. C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 098104
(2005).
[15] H. Ohtsuki, C. Hauert, E. Lieberman, and M. A. Nowak, Nature
441, 502 (2006).
[16] A. Traulsen, J. M. Pacheco, and L. A. Imhof, Phys. Rev. E 74,
021905 (2006).
[17] H. Ohtsuki, M. A. Nowak, and J. M. Pacheco, Phys. Rev. Lett.
98, 108106 (2007).
[18] F. C. Santos, J. F. Rodrigues, and J. M. Pacheco, Proc. Roy.
Soc. Lond. B 273, 51 (2006).
[19] F. C. Santos, J. M. Pacheco, and T. Lenaerts, Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 103, 3490 (2006).
[20] H. Gintis, Game Theory Evolving (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 2000).
[21] A. Traulsen, T. Ro¨hl, and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. Lett. 93,
028701 (2004).
[22] M. A. Nowak, A. Sasaki, C. Taylor, and D. Fudenberg, Nature
428, 646 (2004).
[23] L. A. Imhof and M. A. Nowak, J. Math. Biol. 52, 667 (2006).
[24] A. Traulsen, M. A. Nowak, and J. M. Pacheco, Phys. Rev. E 74,
11909 (2006).
[25] C. W. Gardiner, Handbook of Stochastic Methods for Physics,
Chemistry and the Natural Sciences, Springer Series in Syner-
getics Vol. 13 (Springer, Berlin, 1983).
[26] N. G. v. Kampen, Stochastic Processes in Physics and Chem-
istry, 2 ed. (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1997).
[27] H. G. Schuster, Complex Adaptive Systems (Scator,
Saarbru¨cken, 2002).
[28] R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford University Press, New
York, 1976).
[29] A. Szolnoki and G. Szabo´, Europhys. Lett. 77, 30004 (2007).
[30] C. Taylor, D. Fudenberg, A. Sasaki, and M. A. Nowak, Bull.
Math. Biol. 66, 1621 (2004).
[31] T. Antal and I. Scheuring, Bulletin of Mathematical Biology
68, 1923 (2006).
[32] A. Traulsen and M. A. Nowak, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 103,
10952 (2006).
[33] G. Szabo´ and C. To˝ke, Phys. Rev. E 58, 69 (1998).
[34] M. Perc, New J. Physics 8, 822 (2006).
[35] M. Perc and M. Marhl, New J. Physics 8, 142 (2006).
[36] G. Szabo´, J. Vukov, and A. Szolnoki, Phys. Rev. E 72, 047107
(2005).
[37] A. Sa´nchez and J. A. Cuesta, Jour. Theor. Biol. 235, 233 (2005).
Publications 53
6
[38] M. Perc, New J. Physics 8, 183 (2006).
[39] J. C. Claussen and A. Traulsen, Phys. Rev. E 71, 025101(R)
(2005).
[40] M. Perc, Phys. Rev. E 75, 022101 (2007).
Publications 54
2.3 Impact of fraud on the mean-field dynamics of
cooperative social systems
Publications 55
Impact of fraud on the mean-field dynamics of cooperative social systems
Torsten Röhl,1 Claudia Röhl,2 Heinz Georg Schuster,1 and Arne Traulsen3
1Institute of Theoretical Physics and Astrophysics, University of Kiel, Leibnizstraße 15, D-24098 Kiel, Germany
2Institute of Anatomy, University of Kiel, Olshausenstrasse 40, D-24098 Kiel, Germany
3Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Received 12 March 2007; published 27 August 2007
The evolution of costly cooperation between selfish individuals seems to contradict Darwinian selection, as
it reduces the fitness of a cooperating individual. However, several mechanisms such as repeated interactions
or spatial structure can lead to the evolution of cooperation. One such mechanism for the evolution of coop-
eration, in particular among humans, is indirect reciprocity, in which individuals base their decision to coop-
erate on the reputation of the potential receiver, which has been established in previous interactions. Coopera-
tion can evolve in these systems if individuals preferably cooperate with those that have shown to be
cooperative in the past. We analyze the impact of fake reputations or fraud on the dynamics of reputation and
on the success of the reputation system itself, using a mean-field description for evolutionary games given by
the replicator equation. This allows us to classify the qualitative dynamics of our model analytically. Our
results show that cooperation based on indirect reciprocity is robust with respect to fake reputations and can
even be enhanced by them. We conclude that fraud per se does not necessarily have a detrimental effect on
social systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Evolution is a constant struggle for survival. Individuals
compete continuously. Natural selection implies that indi-
viduals should not support others at a cost to themselves.
Thus, it is surprising that individuals are often willing to
forgo some of their reproductive potential and support others
instead. While such an action reduces fitness in the short run,
it might increase the survival chances in the long run. This
phenomenon has been explained in terms of mechanisms for
the evolution of cooperation, which include kin selection
1,2, group selection 3–5, network reciprocity 6–16, di-
rect reciprocity 17–19, and indirect reciprocity 20–28; see
29 for a recent review. Among humans, a particularly in-
teresting mechanism is indirect reciprocity, which “presum-
ably may distinguish us humans from all other living species
on earth” 30.
Here, we model indirect reciprocity, where cooperation is
based on a status or reputation that individuals obtained in
previous interactions. Indirect reciprocity is frequently ap-
plied to improve trade on online platforms 31–33. Recently,
it has been shown that it is also a potential mechanism that
can help to address such global cooperation problems as cli-
mate preservation 34. Theoretical work on reputation sys-
tems has considered the influence of unintended errors
27,28: A “trembling hand” can lead to the wrong action and
a “fuzzy mind” might lead to a wrong assessment and hence
a wrong reputation. However, a possible manipulation of
reputation by the players is usually not taken into account.
Furthermore, these models do not involve any time delays
and typically assume that an action is immediately assessed
20,35. In reality, this is not always the case: We discover
that we have been ripped off when it is too late, read the fine
print of a contract when we have already signed, or discover
that public funds are missing when it is not longer possible to
backtrack the scammers. Although their behavior is “bad,”
these scammers can maintain a “good” reputation for some
time. Indeed, in human social systems generally a small frac-
tion of people exist who break the rules for their own advan-
tage and are sanctioned by the community 36. As this kind
of “fraud” is fake cooperation, it is different from public
defection and also the effect of punishing this action can
deviate from the conventional ones 37,38. So far, it is un-
clear why sanctions by the community have not eliminated
fraud from social systems. Also the impact of fraud on the
evolution of cooperation has not been analyzed yet. We ad-
dress these questions by extending the image scoring frame-
work described by Nowak and Sigmund 20. Image scoring
is a particular simple moral system assigning a reputation to
an action and determining the choice of an action based on
such reputation. As image scoring bases reputation only on
actions and is independent of previous reputations, it is es-
pecially robust if information on previous encounters is not
reliable. Theoreticians have criticized this framework, as
more sophisticated moral systems avoid the problem that a
good individual who refuses to cooperate with a bad indi-
vidual immediately becomes bad 36,39,40. Moreover, im-
age scoring is not evolutionarily stable and does not belong
to the “leading eight” moral systems of Ohtsuki and Iwasa,
who analyzed 4096 moral systems and identified the eight
most cooperative of them 21. However, behavioral experi-
ments have shown that image scoring is a plausible mecha-
nism for cooperation among humans and is preferred under
many circumstances over more sophisticated moral systems
41–43. It also requires only minimal information. Thus,
image scoring seems to be a reasonable starting point to ad-
dress the problem of fraud. We base our model on the repli-
cator equation, which provides a mean-field description of
the dynamics of game-theoretic systems 44,45. This allows
us to classify the different dynamical regimes of the system
analytically.
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II. THE MODEL
Here, we first recall the image scoring framework and
discuss the intuitive meaning of the parameters. The detailed
mathematical implementation of the process is described in
Secs. II A and II B. In the image scoring framework, two
individuals are chosen at random, one as a potential donor
and one as a recipient. The donor has the possibility to pay
the cost c to support the recipient, who then obtains the ben-
efit bc. A pair of individuals only meets once. Therefore,
the donor does not expect a return from the recipient himself,
but hopes that through establishing a good reputation, the
cost for his cooperation will be compensated by the benefit
from an altruistic act of someone else in future encounters.
We assume that the donor does not support the recipient
directly, but invests in a public good and allows the recipient
to take advantage of this good. Discriminators aim to im-
prove their payoff by investing the cost c in their reputation
and thus attract help from others, because the reputation,
which is initially good for all individuals, only stays good if
they help others and keep public confidence in this way. If
they deny help, their reputation becomes bad. Defectors
avoid the risk of investments in their reputation and do not
support others. Thus, their good reputation from the begin-
ning of each round remains good only until they are chosen
as potential donors and deny help. Whereas in the short run
nondonors yield the higher payoff by saving the costs for
cooperation, in the long run cooperators increase the chance
of obtaining a benefit based on their good reputation, and
cooperation might thus yield the higher payoff.
This reputation-based cooperation can be exploited by
“scammers” who manipulate their own reputation 23, espe-
cially if these do not need to fear imminent punishment.
Therefore, we introduce an additional strategy, namely,
fraud. Scammers only pretend to invest in the public good
and encourage others to use the common good. While this
allows them to maintain a good reputation, it undermines the
system in the long run, since the common resource is over-
used. In reality, this can happen if transfers are made via
anonymous public funds, if checks bounce, or if credit cards
are misused. If the society is unable to detect and prevent
such fraud, it will quickly spread and destroy the system.
However, if there is a certain probability  01 that
fraud is discovered, the situation becomes more interesting.
For =0, fraud is never discovered and will spread in the
population. For =1, reputation can never be faked success-
fully. Whenever a scammer is discovered, he has to pay a
penalty proportional to the number of potential donors, x
+z, but does not change his behavior. The constant  can
take any real value, but it seems to be reasonable that it is of
the same order of magnitude as the benefit from cooperation,
b. This leads to a new kind of dynamics between discrimi-
nators, defectors, and scammers. We follow Nowak and Sig-
mund 20 and model the dynamics with two different stages.
On a fast time scale of interactions, reputations change and
payoffs are accumulated. It is assumed that the information
on the new reputation is available to all individuals before
the next round occurs. On a slower time scale, the differ-
ences between the accumulated payoffs leads to a change of
strategies. In this process, the numbers of discriminators, de-
fectors, and scammers change.
A. Change of reputation and payoff accumulation
We consider three different types of individuals: discrimi-
nators, defectors, and scammers. All three types can have
good or bad reputation or image score. At the beginning of
each generation, the image score is set to good for all indi-
viduals. Individuals interact for several rounds. The fre-
quency of players with bad and good reputations, i.e., image
score i=0,1, is denoted as xi discriminators, yi uncondi-
tional defectors, and zi scammers.
The frequency of individuals with image scores 0 or 1
changes from round to round, since a donation can change
the reputation. An upper index denotes the round; e.g., x1
2 is
the frequency of discriminators with a good reputation in
round 2. In the first round, all individuals have image score
1. Thus, the initial condition of each generation is given by
x0
1
=y0
1
=z0
1
=0. The frequencies x1
1
, y1
1
, and z1
1 which sum up
to 1 reflect the composition of the population. This compo-
sition changes based on the success of the strategies on a
slower time scale see below. In round 1, individuals obtain
payoffs based on the initial reputation, which is always posi-
tive. Consequently, the reputation in round j depends on the
actions in round j−1. Thus, actions in round j determine the
future payoff obtained in round j+1.
For example, consider a discriminator with a good repu-
tation. If he is chosen as a potential donor which happens
with probability 1 /2, his image score changes. If he is
paired with an individual in good reputation, he cooperates
and his reputation remains good. If he is paired with an in-
dividual in bad reputation, he does not cooperate. Then, his
reputation becomes bad. The frequency of discriminators
with a good reputation decreases due to this process from
round j to round j+1. However, it increases when discrimi-
nators with a bad reputation cooperate again with others.
Thus, x1 changes from round j to round j+1 as
x1
j+1
= x1
j + x0
j  j − x1
j 1 −  j/2. 1
Here  j =x1
j +y1
j +z1
j +z0
j is the fraction of all players who ob-
tain help in round j. In an equivalent similar way, we obtain
x0
j+1
= x0
j + x1
j 1 −  j − x0
j  j/2,
y0
j+1
= y0
j + y1
j /2, y1
j+1
= y1
j
− y1
j /2,
z0
j+1
= z0
j + z1
j 1 −  j − z0
j  j/2,
z1
j+1
= z1
j + z0
j  j − z1
j 1 −  j/2. 2
The total numbers of discriminators x=x0j +x1j remains con-
stant during a generation. Equivalently, also y=y0j +y1j and
z=z0
j +z1
j remain constant. Note that the real reputation of
scammers changes despite the fact that their fake reputation
is always good. We note that the reputation dynamics de-
pends only on the fraction of players with different reputa-
tion and strategies. It is independent of the parameters of the
underlying game, i.e., the cost c, the benefit b, the penalty ,
and the detection probability .
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Based on the fractions of players in good and in bad repu-
tation, we now calculate the average payoffs PC, PD, and PS
of cooperative discriminators, defectors, and scammers, re-
spectively. We denote the payoff of a discriminator with
good reputation as PC,1 and the payoff of a discriminator
with bad reputation as PC,0. Equivalent notation is used for
defectors and scammers. When an individual is chosen as a
donor which happens with probability 1 /2 and cooperates,
then the cost of cooperation c is subtracted from its payoff.
For example, a discriminator with a bad reputation cooper-
ates with probability  j in round j. Thus, its payoff changes
on average by −c j /2 in that round. Cooperation leads to the
benefit b. For example, an unconditional defector in good
reputation increases his payoff by b whenever he interacts
with a cooperator or a scammer and is chosen as a recipient.
Thus, its payoff changes by +bx+z /2. For scammers, we
have to distinguish two cases. With probability 1−, they are
viewed as individuals with a good reputation, but never pay
the cost for cooperation. With probability , they are pun-
ished for their fraud. The average payoffs for all players
obtained in round j are
PC,0
j
= −  jc/2,
PC,1
j
= −  jc + bx + z/2,
PD,0
j
= 0, PD,1
j
= bx + z/2,
PS,0
j
= PS,1
j
= 1 − bx + z/2 − x + z/2, 3
where c is the cost, b the benefit,  the detection probability,
and  the penalty for fraud. Figure 1 shows examples of the
dynamics of reputations and payoffs during a generation.
Equations 1 and 2 indicate that there are always some
players of a certain strategy that are in good reputation and
others that are in bad reputation. The success of a strategy
depends on the accumulated payoffs averaged over these two
reputations. After n rounds, discriminators have accumulated
the average payoff
PC = 
j=1
n PC,0
j x0
j + PC,1
j x1
j
x0
j + x1
j . 4
The sums for defectors and scammers simplify to closed ana-
lytical expressions; defectors accumulate the payoff
PD = 
j=1
n PD,0
j y0
j + PD,1
j y1
j
y0
j + y1
j = bx + z1 − 2
−n 5
and scammers obtain
PS = 
j=1
n PS,0
j z0
j + PS,1
j z1
j
z0
j + z1
j =
1 − b − 
2
x + zn . 6
For n=0, no interactions take place and all payoffs are zero.
For a single interaction, n=1, defectors have always the
highest payoff among the three strategies. Discriminators pay
the cost of cooperation, but cannot take advantage of their
reputation. Scammers avoid paying the cost, but with prob-
ability  they are discovered and have to pay the punishment
. Thus defectors are more successful than scammers and
fraud does not pay for a single interaction cf. Fig. 1.
Whether scammers or discriminators obtain a higher payoff
depends on the parameters and on the initial condition. From
PCPS we obtain with n=1 the condition x+zc / b
+. In this case, discriminators are more successful than
scammers. For n2, the dynamics becomes more complex.
Based on these accumulated payoffs for the short-term
dynamics, we can now address the long-term dynamics that
changes the fraction of discriminators, defectors, and scam-
mers.
B. Change of strategies
The average payoffs that are accumulated over n rounds
determine how successful a strategy is. As usual in evolu-
tionary game theory, we equate payoff and fitness and play-
ers produce offspring proportional to their payoff. Note that
each strategy consists of players with good reputation and of
players with bad reputation. The accumulated payoffs con-
sidered here are the averages over the two reputations. We
use the replicator dynamics to identify strategies that are suc-
cessful in the long run based on their payoffs 45. There are
different microscopic processes that lead to slightly different
differential equations 46–49. As they do not change the
stability of fixed points, we do not have to consider these
alternative descriptions here. In the replicator equation, the
fraction of the three strategies changes as
x˙ = xPC − P ,
y˙ = yPD − P ,
z˙ = zPS − P , 7
where P=xPC+yPD+zPS is the average payoff in the
population. The replicator dynamics does not change the nor-
malization, x+y+z=1. Due to the way that payoffs are cal-
culated in Eqs. 3–5, the system is highly nonlinear. Note
that the payoffs and hence the dynamics depends for a given
initial condition on the number of rounds n, the cost c, the
benefit b, the punishment , and the detection probability .
III. RESULTS
The global dynamics of the system is qualitatively deter-
mined by the dynamics between two strategies. As a starting
point for our analysis, we assume that the detection probabil-
ity  is independent of the number of scammers.
A. Constant detection probability
First, we consider the case of discriminators and scam-
mers only. In this case, there are no individuals that do not
receive help, =x1+z=1. Hence, we have PC=PS for detec-
tion probability
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1 =
c
b + 
, 8
independent of n. An  larger than 1 leads to a drift toward
discriminators, a smaller  to a drift toward scammers. How-
ever, a society dominated by scammers is not possible, as
this would produce benefits at no costs. Hence, reputation
loses its meaning before fraud takes over. In reality, there are
additional constraints, e.g., a maximum fraction of scam-
mers. In order to tackle fraud, one should aim for a low cost
to benefit ratio c /b and a high penalty to benefit ratio  /b if
it is not possible to increase the detection probability .
Without discriminators, x=0, the critical detection prob-
ability can be computed from PD=PS, which yields
2 =
b
b + 1 −
2
n
+
21−n
n
	 . 9
For 2, defectors are better off than scammers in the
absence of discriminators and fraud vanishes ultimately as
illustrated in Fig. 2b. Note that, for large n, the ratio 1 /2
reduces to the cost to benefit ratio of cooperation c /b, which
appears to be a crucial parameter for all mechanisms of co-
operation 29.
The dynamics between discriminators and defectors de-
pends only on the cost to benefit ratio and on the number of
rounds in which the reputation of individuals changes
20,50. If the number of rounds is sufficiently high, the dy-
namics is bistable. The position of the unstable equilibrium is
given by the numerical solution of PC=PD.
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FIG. 1. Color online Time evolution of reputation and payoffs for the three different types discriminating cooperators C with fraction
x, defectors D with fraction y, scammers S with fraction z for four different initial conditions. Initially, all individuals are in good reputation.
Full lines show the dynamics of the fraction of individuals with good reputation, dashed lines show the fraction of individuals with bad
reputation. a Without scammers, the reputation of both discriminating cooperators and defectors becomes bad after a few rounds. If the
number of rounds is high enough, the accumulated payoff of discriminators becomes higher, which would in the long-term dynamics lead to
an increase of their fraction initial condition x=0.5, y=0.5. b Dynamics starting from a symmetric mixture of all three strategies, x=y
=z=1/3. Because of the same initial values for discriminators and scammers, both have the same distribution, but different payoffs cf. Eq.
2. Here, the payoff of discriminators is highest for more than four rounds, which leads to an initial increase of the fraction of discrimi-
nators in the replicator dynamics. c Starting from x=0.5, y=0.25, and z=0.25, the number of discriminators and defectors with bad
reputation reaches x0

=0.25 in the long run. Cooperators again obtain the highest payoff if the number of rounds is sufficiently high. d If
the initial condition is x=0.25, y=0.5, and z=0.25, the number of rounds determines the winning strategy: For only one round, defectors are
most successful. If the number of rounds n satisfies 1	n	8, then cooperators are most successful. Finally, scammers have the highest
payoff for n8 in all panels, the parameter values are =0.38, b=1.0, c=0.4, =1.0.
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Let us now return to the full dynamics of all three strate-
gies see Fig. 2. As described above, for 	1, scammers
dominate the system. For 2, scammers have no influ-
ence on the dynamics. The replicator dynamics of the system
has two stable fixed points, unconditional defection and dis-
criminating cooperation. A very different situation is ob-
served for intermediate detection probability 1		2
Fig. 2c. The size of this region increases with the number
of rounds n, since 2 is an increasing function of n. For large
n, it is given by 2−1
b−c / b+ and increases with
larger b−c, but decreases with larger b+.
Qualitatively, the situation is the same for all parameters
within this region: While discriminators prevail compared to
scammers, the scammers can still outperform defectors. The
fixed point of unconditional defection is unstable and the
dynamics leads to scammers. Errors on the trajectory toward
scammer dominance will inevitably lead to the revival of
discriminating cooperators. Similar, mutations in the strate-
gies or stochasticity arising from a finite population size can
also lead from the very narrow path from defectors toward
scammers cf. Fig. 2 into the basin of attraction of discrimi-
nators. These will finally take over the system and cannot be
outperformed by the other two strategies. Hence, fraud has a
counterintuitive positive effect on the evolution of coopera-
tion, as it considerably enlarges the basin of attraction of
discriminators and destabilizes the situation in which only
defectors are present. Interestingly, when few scammers are
present, discriminators benefit from this when competing
with defectors, as their basin of attraction is increased.
To demonstrate the positive effect of scammers and the
increase of the 1		2 region with decreasing cost of
cooperation c, we have numerically calculated the basin of
attraction see Fig. 3 for three different costs of cooperation.
The numerical results are in very good accordance with the
analytical results. For high  the proportion of discriminators
and defectors are determinined by the ratio c /b. For c=0.5
and 	2, the discriminators can even have a larger basin
Discriminators Defectors
Scammers
(c)
(a) (b)
α=0.2 α=0.4
α=0.3
FIG. 2. Color online Simplices representing the evolutionary
dynamics of the discriminator, defector, and scammer strategies for
different detection probabilities . Each point in the given area is
colored depending on the fixed point of the dynamic. The corners
represent the pure strategies. The sides represent competition be-
tween two strategies. For all diagrams the same parameter values
are taken except for the probability  that a scammer is detected. a
If the probability that a scammer is detected is below 1=0.25,
scammers can take over the population =0.2. Discriminators and
defectors survive only if no scammers are initially present. b For
2
0.336, scammers go extinct since they are discovered too
frequently. Depending on the initial condition, cooperators or defec-
tors prevail =0.4. c For intermediate detection probabilities,
1		2, the dynamics leads from defectors to scammers, but
from scammers to discriminators =0.3. The basin of attraction
of the discriminators is significantly larger than in situations with
high  b=1.0, =1.0, c=0.5, n=6, blue dark gray are discrimi-
nators, red medium gray are defectors, green light gray are
scammers.
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FIG. 3. Color online Size of the basin of attraction cf. Fig. 2
of the different stable fixed points in dependence on the detection
probability . As in Fig. 1, C denotes cooperating discriminators, D
unconditional defectors, and S scammers. a In a system with high
cost c=0.5, scammers dominate the system for 	1=0.25. For
1		2=0.336, the basin of attraction of discriminators is
greatly enlarged, but scammers still dominate over defectors. If 
2, then defectors and discriminators dominate. Compared to the
analytical result for the situation without any scammers horizontal
dashed lines, discriminators have a larger basin of attraction. b
For smaller costs of cooperation, c=0.35, the value of 1 is reduced
to 0.175, whereas 2 remains constant. Without scammers, dis-
criminators have a larger basin of attraction than defectors, but in
our case it is further enlarged due to the initial presence of scam-
mers. c If we decrease the cost to c=0.2, the value of 1 is re-
duced to 0.1. In all three panels, each data point is an average over
105 initial conditions. For each initial condition, we solved the rep-
licator equations 6 numerically using a Euler discretization with

t=0.01. After T=105 time steps, we determined the strategy with
the highest abundance. The small peaks of the scammer curve in a
and b for values of 2 indicate a very slow dynamics, in
which the trajectory is after T time steps still close to the unstable
scammer fixed point. For 
t→0 and T→, no scammers are
present for 2 in all panels, the parameter values are b=1.0,
=1.0, n=6 rounds.
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than defectors, in contrast to the situation without scammers.
For small c, discriminators are advantageous compared to
defectors in the absence of scammers. Nonetheless, in the
presence of scammers their basin of attraction increases.
For n=3 rounds, one can analytically show that fraud en-
hances cooperation. In a system without fraud, z=0, and n
=3 rounds, there is an unstable fixed point x* for the dynam-
ics between discriminators and defectors if 0	5c	12b
given by
x* = − 2 +
4b2 − bc − 3c2
b − c
. 10
If we add a small fraction of scammers near this fixed point,
we can ask whether the difference between discriminator and
defector payoff becomes positive or negative. For z≪1, we
find
PC − PD 
 2b − c8 x* +
4b − 5c
8 	z  0. 11
Since this payoff difference is always positive for c	b, dis-
criminators are always better off when few scammers are
present compared to situations without scammers. For n=2.
the reasoning is similar: For 0	4c	b, the unstable fixed
point is given by x*=3c / b−c. For small z we find near the
fixed point PC−PD
b−cz /4, which is positive if c	b.
Thus, for n=2 and n=3 the basin of attraction of discrimi-
nators grows due to the presence of scammers, regardless of
which strategy ultimately prevails.
B. Adaptive detection probability
The analysis in the previous paragraph is a necessary pre-
requisite to tackle the more realistic case in which the prob-
ability to detect scammers increases with their presence. If
only a small fraction of the population steals from public
funds, this is unlikely to have a detrimental effect on the
system and will not be detected. However, if this fraction
grows to larger values, such fraud endangers the common
enterprise and the detection probability grows. The simplest
approach to such a dynamic detection rate is to make it pro-
portional to the number of scammers, i.e., =z. In this way,
it is hard to detect a small number of scammers, while it
becomes significantly easier to detect them if their number
increases. With this extension, the fixed points at the pure
strategies are destabilized see Fig. 4. The ultimate outcome
of the dynamics is given by stable fixed points where a cer-
tain fraction of scammers is present. If discriminators and
scammers coexist this fraction is given by 1 / see Eq. 8.
If defectors and scammers coexist, it is given by 2 / see
Eq. 9.
However, we do not have to restrict ourselves to a linear
function for the detection probability: Our results hold for
any strictly increasing function fz. A steeper increase leads
to a smaller fraction of scammers, which is given by the
solution of fz=1 absence of defectors or fz=2 ab-
sence of discriminators. Thus, the stable fixed points of the
system can be calculated analytically for any strictly increas-
ing function fz. Besides the three trivial unstable fixed
points at x=1, y=1, and z=1, the system also has two non-
trivial unstable equilibria. The fixed point between discrimi-
nators and defectors has been calculated from PC=PD in Eq.
9 for the special case of n=3. In general, it can only be
determined numerically. The fixed point in the interior that
appears only for adaptive detection probability has to be de-
termined numerically from PC=PD=PS for a given set of
parameters.
IV. DISCUSSION
Here, we have introduced a framework for reputation
mechanisms that takes into account fake reputations. Many
social, political, and economical systems show characteris-
tics that emerge from differences in real and fake reputations.
For example, think of political scandals where individuals
act at the expense of the community, not paying any costs
until they are detected or, in the worst case, the system
breaks down. This living at the expense of others is typically
feasible during a limited amount of time only. The simplicity
of our model allows a future comparison with behavioral
experiments, which have successfully corroborated several
theoretical results in game theory 41–43,51. By concentrat-
ing on the mean-field dynamics of the system, we are able to
obtain an analytical classification of the dynamics of the sys-
tem.
In a finite population, stochastic effects would change this
prediction. Without errors or mutations that lead to strategies
that are not present, the system will ultimately reach one of
the corners of the simplex. For small error rates, the new
strategy is lost again or adapted by the whole population
Discriminators Defectors
Scammers
FIG. 4. Color online Dynamics between discriminators, defec-
tors, and scammers with a scammer detection probability  propor-
tional to their abundance z in the system z=z. Since scammers
are very successful when their abundance is low, situations without
scammers become unstable. However, since high abundance of
scammers implicates a high detection probability, the fixed point
with scammers only is destabilized. Depending on the initial con-
dition, the system ends up in one of two fixed points. i For a
coexistence of discriminators and scammers, the fraction of scam-
mers is given by 1 /=0.3. ii For coexistence of defectors and
scammers, the fraction of the latter is given by 2 /=0.358 b
=1.0, c=0.5, =1.0, n=7, =1.
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before a second error arises 52–54. Thus, the stationary
distribution is determined by the transition rates between the
corners of the simplex. In this case, one would expect that
discriminators dominate. However, this analytical approach
involves at least a temporary dominance of scammers, which
might not be feasible in real systems. For higher error rates,
errors in the scammer corner of the simplex or on the trajec-
tories from defectors to scammers in the parameter region
1		2 will lead into the basin of attraction of discrimi-
nators. Even with high error rates, the system will spend
most of the time in the adjacency of the discriminator corner.
Thus, the possibility of faking image scores together with a
small probability for errors can lead to cooperation based on
reputation in this system. A possible extension of this model
is to consider interactions on social networks. However, only
the simplest cases of fixed 6–14,55–62 or evolving net-
works 63–68 allow tackling these problems analytically. In
our case, additional complications occur due to the nonlin-
earity in the calculation of payoffs, which makes most ana-
lytical approaches unfeasible.
In conclusion, our results show that in indirect reciprocity
discriminators might benefit from coexistent scammers that
fake their reputation, depending on their detection probabil-
ity and on the cost to benefit ratio. If scammers dominate
over defectors, they can help discriminators to initiate coop-
eration, as the presence of scammers allows discriminators to
obtain a good reputation. Once defectors are rare, scammers
are displaced by discriminators. When the probability to de-
tect scammers vanishes with the fraction of scammers, a cer-
tain amount of fraud is always found in the system. Thus, a
limited presence of scammers in the population can increase
cooperative behavior. Complex cooperative systems become
vulnerable to self-interested scammers when a critical num-
ber is exceeded or if they cannot be detected at low abun-
dance. This could explain why evolution did not eliminate
fraud from social systems.
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3 Discussion
3.1 Conclusions and Outlook
Evolutionary game dynamics developed into a growing field of mathematics with interest-
ing connections to evolutionary biology and received growing influence on economical and
social research (Aumann and Hart, 2002; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Weibull, 1995).
One reason for this success is that evolutionary dynamics and concepts of evolutionary game
theory can be formulated in terms of exact mathematical equations describing mutation and
selection of replicating individuals (Nowak, 2006). There exist fruitful connections between
game theoretical investigations and theoretical physics, namely, the methods of the theory of
dynamical systems or of statistical mechanics (Hauert and Szabo, 2005; Schuster, 2002; Sella
and Hirsch, 2005). In this thesis, asymmetric conflicts have been analysed and discussed. We
developed a framework, in which two populations with different selection mechanisms inter-
act within a repeated game. Naturally, when individuals interact, their success depends not
only on their own actions, but also on the decisions of others. For example, many problems
in biology, economics, sociology and politics involve decision making in complex situations,
in which the result of an action does not only depend on this action itself but also on the si-
multaneous actions of others. Furthermore, a basic principle is that agents optimize their
behavior with respect to their success (Darwin, 1859; Maynard Smith, 1982). Here, games
were analysed in which, as a new element, i.e. the possibility that the rate of this adaptation
process depends on the overall success of agents compared to their competitors, was intro-
duced. It was found that agents with a flexible, time dependent adaptation rate can increase
their payoff under the influence of external noise, which is present in all real systems in a
natural way. Since noise plays an important role in such systems the obtained results do
not depend of any certain kind of noise, whereas in infinite population the stochastic gain
effect was found by adding a Langevin term of Gaussian distributed noise to the replicator
equations (Fudenberg and Harris, 1992). Nevertheless, external fluctuations can influence
the system in the same way like internal noise can do. Internal noise can arise from “noisy
decision making” individuals making errors with a certain probability when interacting with
other individuals. It is crucial that this kind of noise can generate deviations, which lead
the system away from the equilibrium. In this way a population with an adaptive selection
rate can increase its average payoff during the transient phase, i.e., beyond the Nash equilib-
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rium. In this manner, evolution can be seen as the process leading from a certain status quo
in a certain time, driven to the next state by the natural (=noisy)environment. We proceed
by utilizing recent advances of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations to address
the stochastic gain effect in finite populations, where fluctuations arise naturally from mi-
croscopic dynamics. In contrast to infinite population, in finite populations the evolutionary
dynamics is no longer described by differential equations (e.g. replicator equations). Here
the dynamics is inherently stochastic, depending on the population size and the intensity of
selection (Fudenberg, Nowak, Taylor and Imhof, 2006; Nowak, 2006; Traulsen, Clausen and
Hauert, 2005; Traulsen,Clausen and Hauert, 2006). The demonstration of the stochastic gain
effect in infinite as well as in finite populations is an important point, because most evolution-
ary game dynamics have been studied in infinite, rather than in finite populations. The field
of evolutionary game theory, which deals with finite populations, still has many challenges
for the future. For example, a resemblance between the Moran process in finite popula-
tion and the adjusted replicator dynamics (Maynard Smith, 1982) in infinite populations was
shown. Or, in the same manner, the local update rule in finite populations corresponds to the
standard replicator dynamics (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) in infinite populations.
Different microscopic update mechanisms, namely the Moran process and the local update
rule were analysed. It was shown that the stochastic gain effect can be found in both popu-
lations when using this different microscopic update rules. Furthermore, the existence of the
stochastic gain effect without any variable adaptation rates, solely based on the application
of different microscopic update rules was demonstrated. Even though, it is not the purpose
of this thesis to test the applicability of these methods to real biological systems, it might be
of interest to find these results confirmed in real dynamical biological systems. For exam-
ple, think of interacting different populations using different microscopic mechanisms: In
this case, the behavior of the individuals of each population, which might be partially geneti-
cally determined in a natural way, could correspond with the microscopic update mechanism.
However, the result which demonstrates that agents can exploit noisy disturbances in a res-
onance like fashion has not only potentially important consequences for biological systems.
Especially in economic systems, the possibility of exploiting market fluctuations via flexible
adaptation rates of agents can have interesting practical applications, because the presented
mechanism delivers new insight to benefit also from fluctuations which are usually consid-
ered as negative (Traulsen, Ro¨hl and Schuster, 2004b). Thus, the results of this thesis stress
the importance of the detailed consideration of different microscopic update mechanisms
in finite populations, because they can significantly affect the macroscopic dynamics of a
system.
The second part of this thesis, proceeded with studying the evolution of cooperation by in-
direct reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Nowak, 2006b)
in the context of fraud. Or, more precisely, the impact of fraud in such systems was anal-
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ysed. Usually natural selection is assumed to promote the selfish individuals at the expense
of others (Darwin, 1859; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). On the other side many biological
systems, which include the human societies, are organized to work in a cooperative context.
A standard framework to study indirect reciprocity is a mechanism called image scoring
(Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). We extented this framework for reputation mechanisms by
introducing fake reputations. Fake reputations are quite interesting. Though, so far it is un-
clear, whether intentional fraud occurs in biological systems (Lunau, 2002), the role of fraud
in humans opens a door for investigations reaching from evolution of cooperation to con-
sciousness (Schuster, 2007). Different kinds of fraud could be observed in many biological
(Bra¨nnstro¨m and Dieckmann, 2005; Lunau, 2002) systems and in particular in the human
society (Schiller, 2003; Roberds, 1998). For example, recently it was shown that the size of
the neocortex in a certain primate species is a measure for which individuals of that species
use deceptive tactics for social manipulation (Byrne and Corp, 2004). Often fraud is seen as
a victimless crime, but it affects everyone not only banks or financial institutions. Anyone
who has been a victim of fraud knows the inconvenience and distress it causes. For example,
fraud all together costs the British economy an enormous amount of money, estimated as at
least £13.9 billion in 2005 (ACPO, 2007). The costs of fraud impact throughout the economy
as fraud drives up costs for consumers (for example by increased insurance premiums) and
reduces the amount of money available for public services (because fraudsters claim bene-
fits that they are not entitled to, which leaves less available for public spending). Up to the
present, it is unclear why sanctions by the community have not eliminated fraud from social
systems and also the impact of fraud on the evolution of cooperation has not been analyzed
yet. In other words, what is the role of fraud in biological or social systems? Obviously,
it is difficult to come up with a meaningful answer. However, modelling evolution of in-
direct reciprocity by image scoring seems to be an ideal platform to study the influence of
fraud. Another interesting point is that the simplicity of our model allows further comparison
with behavioral experiments, which have already successfully corroborated several theoret-
ical results in game theory (Bernhard, Fischbacher and Fehr, 2006; Knoch, Pascual-Leone,
Meyer, Treyer and Fehr, 2006; Milinski, Semann, Bakker and Krambeck, 2001; Milinski,
Semmann and Krambeck, 2002; Semmann, Krambeck and Milinski, 2003; Wedekind and
Milinski, 2000). Our model opened a platform for biological experiments as well as for eco-
nomic ones, whereas for the latter one it is presumable easier to start with (Camerer, 2003).
A crucial parameter in our model is the detection probability, which gives us the possibility
to model the frequency of scammers. For example, a high detection probability corresponds
to a low frequency of scammers. Naturally, scammers who are detected, as in real systems,
are punished from the community, i.e., have to pay a high penalty. Recently, it was shown
experimentally (Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006) that even in the presence of effective repu-
tation mechanisms, people do not entirely cease punishing those that put self-interest ahead
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of the collective interest. Furthermore, when given a choice, subjects even prefer a society
with the option of both, maintaining their own reputation on the one side and the possibility
of punishing scammers on the other side (Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006). In consequence,
the introduction of the detection probability seems to be rational. It was shown in this thesis
that for a low detection probability the cheaters also eliminate the discriminators and their
basin of attraction fills in almost the whole simplex area. From the game-theoretical point
of view the system is ”crashed“, because now cheaters would cooperate mutually and thus
could augment their payoff from nothing. On the other side, it is well known that many com-
plex systems (e.g. social, political, economical) seem to show this characteristics that cannot
be described by conventional methods. Think off, for example, political scandals where
’cheaters’ act so long at the expense of the community (cheaters never pay their costs) until
they are detected or, in the worst case, the system crashes. It is worth to note that classical
game theory, for example, like zero-sum games (matrix games) are not able to model suffi-
ciently this ’living on the expense of others’. However, a possibility to avoid the breakdown
of the system due to a low detection probability is to introduce an adaptive detection prob-
ability or using a high detection probability. In real systems both mechanisms are applied
with more or less success.
Taken together, the results show, that in our extended image scoring model for indirect
reciprocity discriminators indeed might benefit from coexisting cheaters depending on their
detection probability and the cost/benefit ratio. It was shown for the first time analytically
that a defined presence of cheaters in the population increases cooperative behavior, i.e., that
cooperation is robust with respect to fake reputations and can even be enhanced by them.
For example, if scammers dominate over defectors, they can help discriminators to initiate
cooperation, as the presence of scammers allows discriminators to obtain a good reputation.
This means that in rainy days, cooperation based systems can benefit from cheaters.
Taken together, the results of my thesis yield new insight in the role of fraud in social
systems, as we showed that fraud per se does not necessarily have an only detrimental effect
on such systems. Complex cooperative systems only become assailable to selfish cheaters,
if a critical number is exceeded. This could by an answer, why evolution did not eliminate
cheating behavior from biological or social systems.
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